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ANTI-EVASION DOCTRINES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Brannon P. Denning* & Michael B. Kent, Jr.**
Abstract
Recent constitutional scholarship has focused on how courts-the
Supreme Court in particular- "implements" constitutional meaning
through the use of doctrinal constructs that enable judges to decide
cases. Judges first fix constitutional meaning, what Mitchell Berman
terms the "constitutional operative proposition, " but must then design
"decision rules" that render the operative proposition suitable to use in
the third step, the resolution of the case before the court. These decision
rules produce the familiar apparatus of constitutional decision-
making-strict scrutiny, rational basis review, and the like. For the most
part, writers have adopted a binary view of doctrine. Doctrinal tests can
defer or not to other actors; implementing doctrines can be fashioned as
rules or standards; doctrines can overenforce or underenforce
constitutional commands. In this Article, though, we unsettle this
dialectical view of doctrinal design by identifying and describing anti-
evasion doctrines (AEDs) in constitutional law: doctrines developed by
courts-usually designed as standards, as opposed to rules-that
supplement other doctrines (designed as rules) to implement particular
constitutional principles.
AEDs touch all areas of constitutional law. In addition to being
ubiquitous, AEDs have a long pedigree. Early examples appear in
famous Marshall Court opinions; thus, they are not some modern
innovation. In addition to naming AEDs, describing the forms they take,
and discussing the characteristics the forms share, this Article also seeks
to describe the benefits and costs to constitutional law resulting from
AEDs, as well as their implications for doctrinal formation more
generally.
We back our claim about the omnipresence and pedigree of AEDs
in Part II with examples from a broad swath of constitutional law. AEDs
supplement rule-like decision rules with decision rules that tend to
resemble standards. In Part III we discuss the benefits of AEDs and the
tradeoffs for doctrine in their widespread use. AEDs are designed to
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help optimize enforcement of constitutional principles-by addressing
"problems with rules, "for example. This gap-Jilling function comes at a
cost, however. Not only does the addition of AEDs tend to increase
doctrinal complexity, but that complexity can also increase decision
costs for courts and dilute the benefits of using rules in the first place.
The tradeoffs are almost mirror images of the benefits.
We discuss the implications of AEDs for constitutional doctrine
generally in Part IV. That they seem to be everywhere in constitutional
law suggests that doctrinal complexity should be seen as a feature of our
system, not a bug, because it attempts to ensure form will not trump
constitutional substance. If a certain amount of complexity is inevitable,
then that suggests one should be skeptical about claims that
constitutional law could be rationalized by abandoning the 'formulaic
Constitution" in favor of simple, predictable, and easy-to-apply rules.
Further, the presence of AEDs furnishes strong evidence for Frederick
Schauer's "convergence hypothesis, " which holds that "[w]hen
authorised to act in accordance with rules, rule-subjects will tend to
convert rules into standards by employing a battery of rule-avoiding
devices that serve to soften the hard edges of rules, " and vice-versa.
Finally, highlighting the role AEDs play in constitutional doctrine, for
good or ill, is another reason to take doctrine, its formation, and
application by courts, seriously.
"The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was
levelled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the
citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by
legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. If the
inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in. the
fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding. "I
"[T']he [Clourt must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an
eye to . . . prevent violations of the Constitution by circuitous and
indirect methods. 2
"[T]he Constitution is concerned, not with form, but with substance. 3
"The [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies [both] sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes ofdiscrimination.'
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1867).
2 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927).
3 Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
4 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
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"The [C]ommerce [C]lause forbids discrimination, whether forthright
or ingenious. "
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent constitutional scholarship has focused on how courts-the Supreme
Court in particular-"implement" constitutional meaning through the use of
doctrinal constructs that enable judges to decide cases.6 Whereas more
conventional accounts of constitutional adjudication portrayed it as involving two
steps-the interpretation of the Constitution and the application of that
interpretation to reach a constitutional holding7-the "two-output" thesis posits
that constitutional adjudication proceeds in three steps.8 Judges first fix
constitutional meaning, what Professor Berman terms the "constitutional operative
proposition," but must then design "decision rules" that render the operative
proposition suitable to use in the third step, the resolution of the case before the
court.9 These decision rules produce the familiar apparatus of constitutional
decision-making-strict scrutiny, rational basis review, and the like.
5 Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454,455 (1940).
6 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 7-101 (2001)
(cataloguing and analyzing how the Supreme Court applies seven different doctrinal tests);
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 (2004); Kermit
Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does,
91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005); see also Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:
Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1575, 1582 (2001) (discussing the structural rules used in constitutional
decisionmaking); Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (2002) (examining
how the Rehnquist Court has applied semisubstantive doctrines); Matthew C. Stephenson,
The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of
Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2008) (arguing that courts should protect
constitutional guarantees by using doctrines designed to raise -the cost to government
decisionmakers who enact unconstitutional policies). For work that uses the two-output
thesis in specific subject areas, see, for example, Robert M. Chesney, National Security
Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REv. 1361 (2009); Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 417 (2008); Arthur
Leavens, Prophylactic Rules and State Constitutionalism, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 415
(2011); and Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497 (2012).
7 Berman, supra note 6, at 32-33.
8 See Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119
HARV. L. REv. F. 220, 221 (2006), available at http://hlr.rubystudio.com/media/pdf/
berman.pdf.
9 Berman, supra note 8, at 221.
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Scholars of this "new doctrinalism"'o have emphasized the discretion courts
exercise when designing doctrine to implement meaning." Professor Fallon, for
example, has identified the various doctrinal tests the Court employs when
adjudicating cases.12 Professors Berman and Roosevelt separately have identified
factors that influence decisionmakers to choose one doctrinal test over another.' 3
For the most part, writers have adopted a dualist view of doctrine. Doctrinal
tests can defer or not to other actors;14 implementing doctrines can be fashioned as
rules or standards;' 5 doctrines can overenforce or underenforce constitutional
commands.' 6
In this Article, we attempt to unsettle this dialectical view of doctrinal design
by identifying and describing anti-evasion doctrines (AEDs) in constitutional law.
AEDs are doctrines developed by courts-usually designed as standards, as
opposed to rules-that supplement other doctrines (designed as rules) to
implement particular constitutional principles. Specifically, AEDs seek to prevent
officials from complying with the form of the previously announced rule, while
subverting the substance of the constitutional principle the rule sought to
implement. Put differently, they attempt to optimize constitutional enforcement by
curbing circumvention of constitutional principles.
Two brief examples of AEDs illustrate the concept. 17 Under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, the Court has traditionally employed an
antidiscrimination rule" to overenforce the constitutional principle that states may
not interfere with interstate commerce in ways that undermine or inhibit national
10 Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and
District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 790 (2008). As indicated, we use the
term "new doctrinalism" to refer to recent scholarship that focuses on the Court's creation
and application of devices to implement the Constitution's meaning. We view this Article
as building on and contributing to this trend.
" See, e.g., Berman, supra note 6, at 92-96; Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1658-67.
12 See FALLON, supra note 6, at 77-79.
13 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 6, at 92-96; Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1658-67.
14 See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 174 (2005).
1 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 56-95 (1992).
16 Berman, supra note 6, at 133-36; see also David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of
Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) ("'[P]rophylactic' rules are not
exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of
constitutional law.").
o t Although we note a number of constitutional areas in which AEDs occur, we rely
on the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and regulatory takings throughout this Article
to illustrate many of our points. There are several reasons for that reliance. First, both of
these doctrines are famously complex and have garnered complaints from scholars, judges,
and practitioners alike. Second, and related to their complexity, anti-evasion principles
seem to lie at the very core of what these doctrines are designed to accomplish. Finally, our
prior individual work has focused chiefly on these two doctrines, and for that reason, we
know them best and have spent the most time thinking about them.
18 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624, 628-29 (1978).
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political unity. 19 This rule holds that states may not treat out-of-state goods or
economic actors worse than their in-state counterparts based on geographic origin.
Were the Court to ban only facial discrimination, however, government actors
could evade the antidiscrimination rule simply by crafting discriminatory laws in
geographically neutral terms. To forestall this evasion-which undermines the
constitutional principle the antidiscrimination rule is meant to implement-the
Court treats laws enacted with a discriminatory purpose or having discriminatory
effects as if they were facially discriminatory and subjects them to the same strict
or heightened scrutiny.20 These purpose and effects inquiries are examples
of AEDs.
Consider also the constitutional command that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation," 2 1 which has been enforced most
directly through decision rules that closely track that command. Thus, the Court
has required governments both to have a public purpose 22 and to tender
compensation when appropriating private property through eminent domain.24
But if only direct condemnation triggered the takings protections, the government
easily. could skirt the constitutional imperative through other means-such as
regulation-equally injurious to property rights.25 To prevent this result, the Court
has held that regulations having sufficiently onerous effects to qualify as
"functionally equivalent" to a direct appropriation also trigger the takings
26
protections. Moreover, although the government may impose certain onerous
conditions on land use to serve a legitimate state interest, those conditions must
nonetheless bear both an "essential nexus" to the interest and a "rough
proportionality" to the externalities resulting from the use.27 Otherwise, the Court
has suggested, the interest advanced by the government is a mere pretext for
evading the constitutional obligation to pay compensation that would otherwise
result.2 8 Again these foci on effects and pretext serve as examples of AEDs.
AEDs touch all areas of constitutional law. In addition to being ubiquitous,
AEDs have a long pedigree. Early examples appear in famous Marshall Court
1 Professor Denning argues this was the operative proposition in Denning, supra note
6, at 484-85.
20 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
23 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 315-16 (1987).
24 See id. at 316 ("[T]he typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn
property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain . . . .").
25 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1872).
26 Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
27 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
28 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the
original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to ... the obtaining of an
easement .. . without payment of compensation.").
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opinions; thus, they are not some modem innovation. In addition to naming AEDs,
describing the forms they take, and discussing the characteristics the forms share,
this Article also seeks to describe the benefits and costs to constitutional
law resulting from AEDs, as well as their implications for doctrinal formation
more generally.
We back our claim about the omnipresence and pedigree of AEDs in Part II
with examples from a broad swath of constitutional law. In addition, we classify
the forms that AEDs take and describe some common characteristics. We argue
that AEDs typically-though perhaps not always-supplement rule-like decision
rules with decision rules that resemble standards.
Part III discusses the benefits of AEDs and the tradeoffs for doctrine in their
widespread use. AEDs are designed to help optimize enforcement of constitutional
principles. A major way they do this is by addressing what Professor Sunstein once
termed "problems with rules." 29 This gap-filling function comes at a cost, however.
Not only does the addition of AEDs tend to increase doctrinal complexity, but that
complexity can also increase decision costs for courts and dilute the benefits of
using rules in the first place. There is also the possibility that judicial focus on
AEDs, like a focus on decision rules generally, can obscure the principle the rules
were meant to enforce, with the result that the doctrinal tail wags the constitutional
dog. Nonetheless, despite their shortcomings, AEDs produce a net benefit in
constitutional law. We argue, following the literature on risk regulation, that AEDs
reflect a "mature position" in the enforcement of constitutional principles.
We discuss the implications of AEDs for constitutional doctrine generally in
Part IV. That they seem to be everywhere in constitutional law-and have been so
for a long time-suggests that doctrinal complexity should be seen as a feature of
our system, and not a bug, because it attempts to ensure form will not trump
constitutional substance. If a certain amount of complexity is inevitable, then that
suggests one should be skeptical about claims that constitutional law could be
rationalized by abandoning what Professor Nagel once called the "formulaic
Constitution," in favor of simple, predictable, and easy-to-apply rules.3 0 In fact, the
presence of AEDs furnishes strong evidence for Professor Schauer's "convergence
hypothesis," which holds that "[w]hen authorised to act in accordance with rules,
rule-subjects will tend to convert rules into standards by employing a battery
of rule-avoiding devices that serve to soften the hard edges of rules," and
-31vice-versa.
As a final implication, we argue that our highlighting the role AEDs play in
constitutional doctrine, for good or ill, is another reason to take doctrine, its
formation, and application by courts, seriously.32 Meaningful doctrinal study, of
29 Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 953 (1995).
3o Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165 (1985).
31 Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV.
303, 312.
32 See Denning, supra note 10, at 793-96 (describing benefits of the doctrinal turn in
constitutional scholarship).
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the type we hope to offer here, can provide better insight into what the Court does,
which in turn allows for better normative evaluations of its work and the functions
it performs. Additionally, focus on doctrinal design can open avenues of common
inquiry among scholars that may differ on the proper interpretative approach to the
Constitution. Finally, doctrinal inquiry has practical, as well as academic, value
and may help bridge any perceived gaps between the legal academy, on the one
hand, and the bench and practicing bar, on the other.
II. DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING ANTI-EVASION DOCTRINES
In this Part, we provide a definition for anti-evasion doctrines, describe the
forms that they can take, and then provide examples of those forms from a number
of different areas of constitutional law. Not only do we show here their prevalence,
but also that AEDs have existed, in some form, as far back as the Marshall Court
and continue to be employed today. A common feature of anti-evasion doctrines,
we argue, is that they tend to take the form of standards as opposed to rules.
A. Definition
As we use it in this Article, anti-evasion doctrines (AEDs) are decision rules 33
developed to fill gaps created by other decision rules, specifically gaps that could
enable governmental actors to comply with the form of those earlier-developed
rules34 while undermining the constitutional principle those rules were intended to
implement. AEDs, in part, are decision rules that attempt to optimize enforcement
of constitutional principles by preventing their easy circumvention.
B. Taxonomy
AEDs themselves, moreover, tend to be one of four types of constitutional
"tests" that should be familiar to students of constitutional law: pretext tests, proxy
tests, purpose tests, or effects tests. 35 Though each has a slightly different
emphasis, and the form each takes varies with the doctrinal context, all have in
33 As noted earlier, Berman's term "decision rules" can take the form of rules
or standards.
34 We recognize that it may not always be the case that the "other" rules to which
AEDs respond were developed prior to the AED itself. As we explain more fully below,
however, we view this as the typical pattern revealed in the Court's jurisprudence. See infra
notes 157-158 and accompanying text. Moreover, we think that our analysis is the same
regardless of whether the AED follows or is created simultaneously with the initial
decision rule that it supplements.
3 With the exception of the "proxy test," we borrow the terminology for the AEDs
from Professor Fallon. See FALLON, supra note 6, 77-79 (2001) (describing the following
doctrinal tests: (1) "forbidden-content tests," (2) "suspect-content tests," (3) "balancing
tests," (4) "non-suspect-content tests," (5) "effects tests," (6) "purpose tests," and (7)
"appropriate deliberation tests").
17792012]
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common an attempt to prohibit indirect violations of a constitutional command by
formal compliance with the decision rule.
As used here, pretext tests ask whether government is, under cover of some
permissible goal, actually attempting to regulate in a manner that the Constitution
forbids. Proxy tests "regulate on the basis of some characteristic that, while
purportedly neutral, has little independent significance and is in reality a proxy
for"3 6 some characteristic prohibited by the constitutional command or the decision
rule. Purpose tests ask whether the law has been "developed or applied for
constitutionally illegitimate reasons."37 Finally, effects tests "focus not on the
explicit content of a statute or policy, but on its effects."3 In the rest of this
section, we offer several examples in each of these categories.
1. Pretext Tests
(a) The Necessary and Proper Clause
In his capacious interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause,40 which
committed to Congress substantial discretion in choosing means to achieve
enumerated ends, Chief Justice John Marshall concluded with a warning:
[S]hould congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of
the land.4 '
Marshall did not specify how the Court was to distinguish pretextual from non-
pretextual invocations of the doctrine of implied powers, much less ever strike an
42implied power down on that ground. Subsequent Courts were equally reticent.
36 Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401,
1416 (1994).
3 FALLON, supra note 6, at 79 (citation omitted).
38 d
39 These four categories tend to share characteristics with each other, and they may
overlap in certain contexts. Thus, we recognize that some of our following examples might
acceptably be viewed in multiple categories or in categories other than those in which we
place them.
40 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-24 (1819).
41 Id. at 423.
42 But see Nat'I Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (discussing McCulloch's warning about pretextual invocations;
noting that "we have also carried out our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those
laws that undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution").
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Nevertheless, the statement is an early expression of the idea that the Court would
not elevate form over substance when it came to core constitutional values.
(b) The Commerce Clause
Congress did not make much use of the Commerce Clause to authorize
federal government power-as opposed to restraining state power over interstate
commerce-until the late nineteenth century.43 While the Court countenanced
considerable exercises of that power in cases like Champion v. Ames" and the
Shreveport Rate Cases,45 it assumed that there were areas of legislative authority
that were reserved to the states exclusively. The Court would thus invalidate
exercises of the commerce power on what it deemed pretextual grounds-
that is, that Congress's real aim was the invasion of these areas of exclusive
state authority.
Take Hammer v. Dagenhart,46 for example. Despite cases like Champion,
which endorsed broad congressional power to close the channels of interstate
commerce to particular goods,4 7 the Court in Hammer invalidated an act
prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made using child labor.
Distinguishing earlier cases on the grounds that they had regulated the
transportation of goods that were somehow inherently harmful,4 8 the Court rejected
the argument that goods produced using child labor qualified as "harmful."49
According to the Court, the legislation was not truly aimed at transporting
harmful articles in interstate commerce because "[t]he goods shipped are of
themselves harmless."50 Rather, the legislation was more accurately described as
an attempt "to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining
and manufacturing within the States."51 Thus, the purported regulation of
commerce was really a pretext for regulating health and welfare, areas the Court
43 See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166
(8th ed. 2010).
4 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (holding that power to "regulate" included power to
prohibit mailing of lottery tickets that moved across state lines).
45 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (concluding that "[w]herever the interstate and
intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the
control of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final
and dominant rule").
46 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
47 Champion, 188 U.S. at 363; see also Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)
(upholding Mann Act, prohibiting transportation of women in interstate commerce for
immoral purposes); Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding
Pure Food and Drug Act's prohibition of shipment in interstate commerce of impure or
adulterated foods).
4 8 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271.
49 Id. at 272.
50 id.
51 Id.
17812012]
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assumed were left to the exclusive control of the stateS. 52 "The grant of authority
over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power always
existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution," the Court noted, adding that "[p]olice regulations relating to the
internal trade and affairs of the States have been uniformly recognized as within
such control."5 3
The Court adopted a similar position regarding congressional attempts to
regulate the coal industry-one of Franklin Roosevelt's signature New Deal
programs-in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 54 In his opinion, Justice Sutherland
distinguished between "commerce," on the one hand, and activities like mining
that were "local" and "antecedent" to commerce, on the other.5 The latter, he
maintained, remained the exclusive province of the states.
Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the struggle between
employers and employees over the matter of wages, working conditions,
the right of collective bargaining, etc., and the resulting strikes,
curtailment and irregularity of production and effect on prices; and it is
insisted that interstate commerce is greatly affected thereby. But, in
addition to what has just been said, the conclusive answer is that the evils
are all local evils over which the federal government has no legislative
control. The relation of employer and employee is a local relation.56
As in Hammer, the Court concluded that the invocation of the commerce
power was merely pretextual; the real aim was to regulate those local matters that,
in the Court's opinion, the Constitution intended to leave to the states.57 The Court
explained that Congress could regulate matters that "directly" affected interstate
commerce; the multitude of other things that affected interstate commerce only
"indirectly" were beyond congressional reach.58 The Court further explained that
"[t]he word 'direct' implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall
operate proximately-not mediately, remotely, or collaterally-to produce the
effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition." 59
The Court also stressed that "the extent of the effect bears no logical relation to its
character. The distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon
52 Id. at 273-74 ("The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate
commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to
control the States in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture.").
" Id. at 274.
54 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
5 Id. at 303-04.
1 Id. at 308.
57id
5 1 Id. at 307-08.
59 Id.
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the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in
which the effect has been brought about."60
(c) Conditional Spending
In South Dakota v. Dole,6 1 the Court held that conditions on spending were
permissible--even where Congress lacked authority to impose them directly-if
(1) spending was for the "general welfare," (2) the condition was clear and
unambiguous, (3) the condition was related to a federal interest in a particular
program, and (4) the condition did not otherwise violate another part of the
Constitution.62 In addition, however, the Court suggested that, at some point,
linking conditions to spending could cross a line into "coercion" that deprived
states of a real choice. This "coercion" limit echoed prior decisions in cases like
United States v. Butler,64 in which the Court invalidated an earlier conditional
spending program on the ground that it was an indirect attempt by Congress to
regulate agriculture and production that were the exclusive reserves of the states. 65
While the Dole Court did not indicate under what circumstances a spending
condition might trigger this limitation,66 in 2012 seven members of the Court held
that the Affordable Care Act went too far in putting to states the "choice" between
60 Id. at 308. The Court would, of course, abandon this later. Current law holds that
the regulation of even local economic subject matters can be regulated if, in the aggregate,
they would substantially affect interstate commerce, even if individual instances of the
class of activities regulated would, by itself, not have that effect. See, e.g., Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005) (upholding application of the federal Controlled
Substances Act to local, noncommercial possession and use of marijuana for medical
purposes as authorized by state law). Five Justices in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), recently opined that Gonzales did not enable
Congress to reach inactivity alleged to substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 2587
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to
the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could
potentially make within the scope of federal regulation, and . . . empower Congress to
make those decisions for him."); id. at 2648 (joint dissent) ("[I]f every person comes within
the Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate by the simple reason that he will one
day engage in commerce, the idea of a limited Government power is at an end."). For a
recent argument asserting that the Court should revive pretext analysis for congressional
exercises of its commerce power, see Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in
Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1251 (2003).
6' 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
62 Id. at 207-08.
63 Id. at 208.
64 297 U.S. 1 (1936).65 Id. at 70-71.
66 For scholars' attempts to articulate limits to the spending power, see, for example,
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911,
1921-23 (1995); and Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 23-33 (2003).
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a radical (and expensive) expansion of Medicaid and the loss of all Medicaid
funds.6 Writing for himself-joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan-the
Chief Justice wrote that unlike past cases such as Dole, "the financial 'inducement'
Congress has chosen is much more than 'relatively mild encouragement'-it is a
gun to the head."68 As the joint dissent of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito put it, "[I]f States really have no choice other than to accept the package, the
offer is coercive, and the conditions cannot be sustained under the'spending power.
... [T]heoretical voluntariness is not enough."69 Thus, at a minimum, a solid
majority has defined "coercive" federal spending conditions to be those that leave
states no realistic alternative than to accept them.
(d) The Takings Clause and "Public Use"
In its controversial decision in Kelo v. City of New London,70 the Court
reaffirmed that to satisfy the Fifth Amendment's "public use" requirement, a
government condemnation of private property must serve some public purpose.
Additionally, the Court noted that the term "public purpose" was to receive a broad
construction, reflecting the deference owed to legislative determinations on the
issue.72 Even so, the Court suggested that such deference was not the same as
outright abdication of the issue to the legislative branches. After noting that the
City would be prohibited from condemning property for the overt purpose of
conferring purely private benefits, the Court went on to say that the City would
also be prohibited from taking property "under the mere pretext of a public
purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit." 3 Justice
Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote in Kelo, echoed this admonition in
his concurrence: "[T]ransfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored
private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are
forbidden by the Public Use Clause."74
2. Proxy Tests
(a) The Tonnage Clause
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution prohibits states from "lay[ing] any
Duty of Tonnage" without congressional consent.75 Duties of tonnage are. those
67 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (plurality opinion)
(calling the penalty a "gun to the head").68 Id.69 Id. at 2661 (joint dissent).
70 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
71 Id. at 480.
7 2 id.
73 Id. at 477-78.
74 Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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imposed on the carrying capacity of ships upon entry or exit from a port.
However, the Court has invalidated certain fees not computed on the basis of
carrying capacity as violations of the Tonnage Clause. In Southern Steamship Co.
v. Portwardens,n for example, Louisiana imposed a flat fee for the privilege of
entering the Port of New Orleans. Invalidating the fee, the Court observed:
We think, also, that the tax ... is, in the fair sense of the word, a duty on
tonnage. In the most obvious and general sense it is true, those words
describe a duty proportioned to the tonnage of the vessel; a certain rate
on each ton. But it seems plain that, taken in this restricted sense, the
[Tonnage Clause] would not fully accomplish its intent . . . . It was not
only a pro rata tax which was prohibited, but any duty on the ship,
whether a fixed sum upon its whole tonnage, or a sum to be ascertained
by comparing the amount of tonnage with the rate of duty.78
The approach of the Southern Steamship Court was recently affirmed in Polar
Tankers, Inc. v. Valdez," in which the Court struck down a state ad valorem tax on
large vessels docking at Alaska's ports. Though by its terms it applied to all
vessels exceeding ninety-five feet in length or that take on cargo or engage in
business worth more than $1 million, in practical effect, "[t]he ordinance applies
almost exclusively to oil tankers."80 Moreover, "a tax on the value of such vessels
is closely correlated with cargo capacity."8' Concluding that the case "lies at the
heart of what the Tonnage Clause forbids," the Court invalidated the tax.82
(b) The Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV
Article IV, § 2 guarantees "[t]he Citizens of each State" the "Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."8 At least for "fundamental rights,"84
like the right to compete for business or to pursue a common calling, states cannot
76 BORIS I. BITTKER WITH THE COLLABORATION OF BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER
ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §. 12.10, at 12-38 to -39
(1999) (distinguishing tonnage duties from "fees assessed for specific services, such as
towage ... or pilotage").
7 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
78 Id. at 34-35.
79 557 U.S. 1 (2009).
80 Id. at 10.
8' Id.
82 d
83 U.S. CO?4sT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
84 See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (finding that
hunting is not fundamental right; state charging out-of-state residents more for elk hunting
license did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
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treat out-of-state citizens worse than in-state citizens. If state or local measures
do so, the state must prove (1) a substantial reason for the discrimination, and
(2) that the discrimination bears a substantial relationship to the reason for
discriminating in the first place.8 6 Some commentators have argued that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause might not apply unless there is explicit
discrimination.
In Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons,88 however, the Court held that discrimination
on the basis of state citizenship or state residence were not the sole bases for
maintaining a Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge. 8 9 Out-of-state milk
producers challenged amendments to California's milk pricing scheme, alleging,
among other things, that the amendments violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. 90 The lower court rejected the claim, holding that the producers had no
standing to raise the claim because the California law did not classify on the basis
of either state citizenship or state residency.91 In an earlier case, Chalker v.
Birmingham & Northwestern Railway Co.,92 the Supreme Court held that a
Tennessee tax imposed on persons having their principal place of business outside
the state violated the Clause.93 Without ruling on the merits of the claim, the
Hillside Dairy Court reaffirmed Chalker:
Whether Chalker should be interpreted as merely applying the Clause to
classifications that are but proxies for differential treatment against out-
of-state residents, or as prohibiting any classification with the practical
effect of discriminating against such residents, is a matter we need not
decide at this stage of these cases. Under either interpretation, we agree
with petitioners that the absence of an express statement in the California
laws and regulations identifying out-of-state citizenship as a basis for
disparate treatment is not a sufficient basis for rejecting this claim.9 4
81 See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948) (finding imposition of a
higher license fee for out-of-state shrimpers violates Privileges and Immunities Clause).
86 Id. at 396.
87 See Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 390-91
& n.22 (2003) (making the argument and citing sources sharing that assumption).
88 539 U.S. 59 (2003).89 Id. at 67.
90 Id. at 63-64.
91 Id. at 67.
92 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
93 Id. at 527.
94 Iillside Dairy, 539 U.S. at 67.
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(c) Land Use Exactions
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission95 and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 96
the Court held that land use exactions would be deemed compensable takings
where they did not bear an "essential nexus" to a legitimate state interest97 and a
"rough proportionality" to the putative impact the proposed land use would have
on that interest.98 This test operates in a manner similar to a proxy test by looking
to see whether the government is imposing conditions on the use of land as a
substitute for appropriating private property via eminent domain. The facts of
Nollan prove illustrative. In that case, the government conditioned approval of a
development permit on the applicants granting a lateral easement across their
parcel so as to connect two public beaches that lay on either side. 99 The
government justified this condition on the grounds that the new house would
obstruct the beaches from view of the road, impairing the public's "visual access"
to the beaches.100 The Court, however, held that the condition amounted to an
unconstitutional taking because it bore no connection to the public harm-
impairment of "visual access"-that the development supposedly was going to
cause.101 Absent such a connection, the condition was simply an attempt to
appropriate the easements in a manner that would avoid the government's having
to pay for them. 10 2
(d) State Action Doctrine
Despite its reputation as a "conceptual disaster area,"1 0 3 the Court has
continued to enforce the state action doctrine, which limits the reach of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to "state actors."' 0 4 However, the Court has
pierced the private actor veil, so to speak, on occasions where private entities
exercise some "quintessential public function." In Marsh v. Alabama,05 for
9 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
96 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
9 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
98 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391.
99 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
'oo Id. at 838.
'o' Id. at 838-39.
102 Id. at 837 ("[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of
the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The
purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement .. . without payment of
compensation.").
103 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000) (invalidating civil
suit provision of the Violence Against Women Act); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883) ("It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion
of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment.").
105 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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example, the Court found that a company-owned town was a state actor because it
furnished all the services and performed the usual functions of a municipality.'0o
As a state actor, it was subject to the First Amendment and thus unable to stop a
person from distributing literature on its streets.'0 7
Another exception to the state action doctrine was created in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 08 where the Court held that a private coffee shop
that discriminated against African-Americans was a state actor because of its
location in a public parking facility and the terms of its lease with the public
authority that ran that facility. 0 9 Based on the facts, the Court concluded that
[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [the coffee shop] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in
the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to
have been so "purely private" as to fall without the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 10
The Court recently applied its "pervasive entwinement" exception to hold that a
state high school athletic association was a state actor where its members included
most of the public schools in the state, its board included state officials as ex
officio members, and its employees were state employees eligible for participation
in the state retirement program."'
3. Purpose Tests and Effects Tests
(a) Free Speech
A core distinction in First Amendment doctrine is that between content-based
and content-neutral speech regulations.1 2 Content-based speech restrictions are
subject to strict scrutiny, while content-neutral restrictions need to satisfy the less
demanding intermediate scrutiny."' However, the Court's application of
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulations includes an inquiry into
whether "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression."ll 4 If "the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
10 6 Id. at 507-08.
1o7 Id. at 508-10.
108 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
'
09 Id. at 723-24.
'10 Id. at 725.
"' Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
298 (2001).
112 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 932-
33 (3d ed. 2006).
I13 Id. at 933.
114 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine,
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disagreement with the message it conveys," then the regulation will be subject to
strict scrutiny despite its facial content-neutrality."
(b) Free Exercise
After Employment Division v. Smith,1 6 generally applicable regulations that
incidentally affect an individual's free exercise of religion do not violate the Free
Exercise Clause." 7 However, the Court has held that facially neutral regulations
that, in their effects, target a particular religion or set of religious practices are
subject to strict scrutiny." 8 A plurality of the Court has similarly held that
"ordinances .. . enacted 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' their suppression of
[a] religious practice" are similarly subjected to strict scrutiny despite their
apparent facial neutrality."19
(c) The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD) limits the ability of state
and local governments to discriminate against or otherwise impermissibly burden
interstate commerce.120 A state or local law discriminating against interstate
commerce on its face'21 is subject to a "virtually per se rule of illegitimacy,"
requiring the government to demonstrate that (1) the law is aimed at a legitimate-
which is to say non-protectionist-end, and (2) that no less-discriminatory means
are available to effectuate that end.12 2 Nondiscriminatory but burdensome laws are
subject to a more lenient balancing test requiring the challenger to prove that the
burdens on interstate commerce clearly exceed the local benefits claimed for
the law.123
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996) (discussing the application of First Amendment law as a tool
to discover and invalidate government actions that are done with improper motives).
"s Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
116 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
" Id. at 878; U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion] . . ).
' Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
"'
9 Id. at 540-41.
120 See generally Denning, supra note 6, at 447-48 (surveying the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine).
121 Facially discriminatory laws are not subject to this scrutiny if the state or local
government is either acting as a "market participant" or is discriminating in favor of a
"public entity." See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 362-63 (2007); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442-46 (1980)
(upholding "locals-first" rule by state-owned cement plant faced with a glut of orders
brought on by cement shortage). The Court has also assumed, without so holding, that cash
subsidies may be offered on a discriminatory basis. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994).
122 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
123 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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But the Court has applied heightened scrutiny even to facially neutral laws
that were shown either to have been passed with a discriminatory purposel24 or
result in discriminatory effects. 125 Among the effects the Court has held to trigger
this heightened scrutiny are (1) effectively barring the import of out-of-state goods
or barring their sale once imported, (2) raising the costs of doing business in a state
for out-of-state but not in-state competitors, (3) stripping competitive advantages
from out-of-state businesses, or (4) leveling the playing field in favor of in-state
competitors.126 The Court has also invalidated a tax-and-subsidy scheme
that resulted in only out-of-state businesses paying a particular tax (because
in-state businesses received subsidies paid out of revenues gleaned by a facially
neutral tax). 12 7
Additionally, even truly facially neutral statutes, untainted by discriminatory
purpose and lacking discriminatory effects, may nevertheless be invalidated if, in
the opinion of the Court, the burdensome effects on interstate commerce "clearly
exceed" the local benefits claimed for the law. 128
(d) Abortion
The plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey1 29 discarded Roe v. Wade's trimester framework, substituting "viability" as
the point at which the state may bar abortions altogether.130 For previability
abortions, the Court-again in contrast to Roe-found that the state had an interest
in protecting potential life and that it was entitled to regulate abortions to further
that interest.13 1
To distinguish between permissible and impermissible regulation of
previability abortions, the plurality also articulated the "undue burden" test: "[A]
law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself," but
which "has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or expensive to procure
an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it." 13 2 A "finding of undue burden," the
Court further explained, "is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."133
124 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
125 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertisers Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-53 (1977).
126 Id. at 350-52.
127 West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1994).
128 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
129 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
130 Id. at 846.
... Id. at 872.
132 Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
' Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
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(e) Race Discrimination
Though the Court has held that disparate impact is not sufficient to maintain a
race discrimination claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,134 intent to
discriminate may be found other than on the face of the statute. In Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,'35 the Court
acknowledged the difficulty that its decision in Washington v. Davis placed on
plaintiffs attempting to prove that. a facially neutral law was, in fact, motivated by a
discriminatory intent. "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
a motivating factor," the Court wrote, "demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." 3 6
While not "purporting to be exhaustive," the Court suggested several
"subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent
existed."' 3 7 These included: (1) "whether [the official action] 'bears more heavily
on one race than another"'; (2) "[t]he historical background of the decision ... ,
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes";
(3) "[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision"; (4)
"[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence" of decisionmaking; (5)
"[s]ubstantive departures . . . , particularly if the factors usually considered
important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one
reached"; and (6) "[t]he legislative or administrative history . . . , especially where
there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
minutes of its meetings, or reports." 3 8
. Plaintiffs can also show that a facially neutral law is enforced in a
discriminatory manner. When, in a discriminatory manner, a city enforced an
ordinance requiring that laundries be located in brick or stone buildings only
against Chinese-owned laundries, the Court reversed a conviction for violating the
ordinance.' 39 The Court concluded that the evidence demonstrated the authorities
were applying the ordinance "with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount
to a practical denial by the State of. . . equal protection of the laws."l40
(f) The Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits abridging voting rights by states or the
federal government "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."' 4 ' Here too, though, "laws that are facially neutral will be declared
unconstitutional when they were motivated by a discriminatory purpose and have a
134 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
'3 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
116 Id. at 266.
13 1 Id. at 268.
138 Id. at 266-68.
139 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
140 Id. at 373.
141 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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discriminatory impact." 4 2 In Guinn v. United States,14 3 for example, the Court
invalidated a literacy test that exempted voters and their descendants who could
vote in 1865.144 The motive behind this so-called "grandfather clause" was to
exclude black voters. 145 And in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,146 the Court concluded that
the redrawing of the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, was done with the intent to
exclude nearly all African-Americans from its boundaries.14 7 Because of the
improper motive, the Court concluded the city's actions, though neutral on their
face, violated the rights to suffrage guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. 148
(g) Regulatory Takings
As noted in the Introduction, the Court's regulatory-takings jurisprudence
largely operates as an anti-evasion measure to prevent the government from
skirting its obligation to compensate owners for the taking of their property. The
complex series of decision rules that make up this jurisprudence seem, at bottom,
to take the form of effects tests. First, consider the rule articulated in Loretto v.
Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp.,149 where the Court held that a regulatory
action that results in a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking per
se.' 50 The Court explained this rule first by focusing on the consequences of such
an occupation, which it viewed as "effectively destroy[ing] each" of the traditional
rights of a property owner to possess, use, transfer, and exclude.' 5' The Court also
has held that constructive physical occupations of private property are to be treated
as actual occupations inasmuch as "[t]here is no material difference" between the
two types.'52 Further, a regulation can be tantamount to permanent physical
occupation if it deprives the owner of "all economically beneficial or productive
use of land"'s3 because, in such circumstances, the regulation is, "from the
landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation. "14 Echoing
the effects test characteristics of these holdings, the Court recently explained that
its takings decisions focus "directly upon the severity of the burden that
142 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 112, at 898.
143 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
'" Id. at 366-68.
145 Id. at 365.
146 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
147 Id. at 347-48.
I48 Id.
149 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
so Id. at 434-35 (holding that permanent physical invasion.is a taking "without regard
to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner"); see also id. at 438 n.16 (making clear that the size of the occupation
is irrelevant).
'' Id. at 435-36.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946).
'1 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
15 4 Id. at 1017.
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government imposes upon private property rights"155 with the goal of
"identify[ing] regulatory. actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic
taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the
owner from his domain.""5
C. Common Characteristics ofAnti-Evasion Doctrines
In these numerous and varied areas of constitutional doctrine, a pattern
emerges. The Court begins with a decision rule to enforce a particular
constitutional principle. That decision rule, in turn, is bolstered or backstopped by
an AED intended to prevent circumvention of the constitutional command by
formal compliance with the decision rule itself-that is, compliance that
nevertheless permits avoidance of the principle the initial decision rule was
designed to implement. Moreover, AEDs tend to crop up when that initial decision
rule takes the form of a rule. The AEDs, by contrast, tend to be formulated as
standards rather than rules.
We use this general pattern to describe AEDs because it represents what we
see in many of the Court's own decisions-that is, early opinions that implement a
constitutional principle with a rule-like decision rule, followed by subsequent
decisions that bolster that rule with more standard-like decision rules. 57 But we do
not mean to suggest that this pattern necessarily holds in every context in which
the Court has employed AEDs. It may be that there are AEDs that take a more
rule-like form to backstop decision rules that themselves take the form of
standards. 58 Additionally, there are instances where AEDs, rather than following
after a primary decision rule, are instead pronounced simultaneously with it.'59 For
analytical purposes, however, these distinctions do not make much of a difference.
Overall, the ebb and flow of constitutional adjudication tends to consist of the
Court's establishment of a primary, typically rule-like decision rule that is
backstopped by a typically standard-like AED (whether created subsequently or
simultaneously). Moreover, by describing the AED as a "backstop," we do not
intend to minimize the importance of the backstopping function or somehow
suggest that the AED enjoys a subordinate place in the relationship-any more
than a good catcher in baseball is subordinate to a pitcher. Rather, as we explain
1ss Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
'
56 Id.
' See, e.g., infra notes 359-362 (describing the Court's takings jurisprudence).
158 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (employing rule-like
requirements to backstop basic norm that statements made by criminal defendant
be voluntary).
159 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 211 (1987) (pronouncing
AED in same opinion as primary decision rule). It seems that the "activity/inactivity"
distinction in National Federation of Independent Business is another such rule-like AED
intended to backstop the more standard-like "substantial effects" test. See Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589-90, 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at
2649 (joint dissent).
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more fully below, this pattern demonstrates that the overall doctrine of a
constitutional area will employ both rules and standards in a converging, symbiotic
relationship--with the rules designed to address the earlier and easier cases, and
the standard-like AEDs designed to deal with those cases that are more difficult.
The interaction between initial decision rules and AEDs thus implicates the
rules-versus-standards debate, and it also has implications for doctrinal formation
generally. In this section, we situate our discussion of AEDs in that rules/standards
debate and illustrate our argument with some examples. The next part describes
in detail the benefits and tradeoffs accompanying these reinforcing sets of
decision rules.
The rules-versus-standards distinction is a familiar one in legal scholarshipl 60
and in constitutional law.' 6' The literature "commonly emphasize[s] the distinction
between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post.,, 6 2 Rules seek to give
content to law ex ante, while standards permit it to be given after the fact. 63 As
Professor Sullivan explained, "Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts,
leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out
elsewhere."'1" The classic example is that of a law limiting speeds to X miles per
hour. Standards, on the other hand, "allow for the decrease of errors of under- and
over-inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules." 65
Instead of expressing a limit as X miles per hour, a speed limit formulated as a
standard might read, "Drive at a reasonable speed given road conditions." Here,
when we talk about standards, we adopt this general description-that standards
give decisionmakers discretion to make law ex post and in light of the facts of
individual cases.
160 The literature on rules versus standards is voluminous. For succinct introductions
to the debate, see WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING
ABOUT THE LAW 164-68 (2007); and FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A
NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 189-200 (2009). Canonical articles include
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992),
Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989), Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985), Sullivan, supra note 15, and
Sunstein, supra note 29. For an interesting account of how judges choose between rules and
standards, see Scott A. Baker & Pauline Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice
(Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-01-04, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract--1983446/; Andrew B..Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance
of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422 (2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstract id=2000735/; and Frank Cross et al., A Positive Political Theory of
Rules and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
161 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 15.
162 Kaplow, supra note 160, at 559 (citation omitted).
163 Id. at 601 ("A legal command is defined here to be rule-like to the extent that
greater effort has been expended ex ante, rather than requiring such effort to be made
ex post.").
164 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 58 (citation omitted).
165 Id. at 58-59 (citation omitted).
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In our account, AEDs exist to bolster the rule and, by extension, the
constitutional principle (Berman's "constitutional operative proposition") that the
initial decision rule was intended to implement. In some cases, the initial decision
rule closely tracks the language of the Constitution itself. For example, the Court
has interpreted the prohibition on tonnage duties to, well, bar states from laying
tonnage duties on vessels.16 6 Similarly, the state action doctrine is rooted in the
address of the Fourteenth Amendment to states, in contrast to the Thirteenth
Amendment, which contained no such limitation.
But in both cases, standard-like AEDs supplement those rules to enforce the
substance of the constitutional principle in the face of attempts at formal
compliance that, if tolerated, would effectively gut the prohibitions. Therefore, any
tax or levy that is directly or indirectly based on the carrying capacity of a ship (a
levy on the total value of the cargo, for instance), whatever it may be called,
violates the Tonnage Clause. 169 Similarly, not all private actors can escape the
obligations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Private actors "pervasively entwined"
with state actors or who perform all the tasks of a state actor will themselves be
considered state actors, despite their putative private status.170
Note, too, how these formula-"pervasively entwined" and "closely
correlates"-do not establish rigid criteria that determine either how pervasive the
entwinement need be or how closely to cargo capacity a tax needs to correlate.
These are determinations that courts make after the fact, in light of the particular
facts before them. They are standards, in other words.
The Takings Clause presents another example of the pattern we describe.
First, as noted above, the Court has made clear that it will ordinarily defer to
legislative judgments that a particular taking is "for public use."' 7 Even so, it
stated in Kelo that pretextual public use takings that in actuality transferred land
between private owners for private purposes would not be countenanced, even as
the Court left rather vague what facts would support a finding of pretext.172 In
addition, the Court's entire regulatory takings jurisprudence serves as an elaborate
body of AEDs, preventing government from simply using its regulatory power to
achieve indirectly what could not be accomplished through outright
appropriation-that is, an uncompensated taking.'73 Further, and it is the subject of
much complaint from members of the Court and commentators, the regulatory
takings doctrine depends largely on standards, from Justice Holmes's "too far"
166 See Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 32, 34-35 (1867).
167 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
168 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
169 See Steamship, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 34-35.
170 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
298 (2001).
171 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
172 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).
173 Here, the regulatory takings doctrine backstops the constitutional requirement that
just compensation be provided for the taking of private property.
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standardl 74 to Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York's 7 s
considerations of "economic impact," "investment-backed expectations," and
"character of the governmental action.",7
This is true even with Justice Scalia's attempt in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council'77 to create a categorical rule that a taking occurs any time
"regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."' 7 8 After
announcing this rule-like test, Justice Scalia undercut its precision in two respects.
First, he admitted that there remained some question as to what might constitute
"deprivation of all economically feasible use."179 Second, he provided an exception
to the rule for "restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." 8 o
Finally, the myriad purpose and effects tests that pervade constitutional
doctrine, though they may look rule-like at first blush, often operate as standards
designed to prevent governmental actors from simply enacting facially neutral laws
cleverly drawn to circumvent decision rules. There is a rule-like ring to
pronouncements such as, "no speech prohibition based on content," "no
discrimination based on race," "no discrimination against out-of-state commerce,"
and so on. In practice, however, these pronouncements work as standards because
the Court rarely announces what sorts of evidence and how much will prove
purpose or which effects and how many are required to demonstrate forbidden
effects. It leaves those decisions to the discretion of subsequent courts for
application ex post.
AEDs typically are decision rules fashioned as standards that, in turn, ensure
that governmental officials cannot easily evade or undermine constitutional
commands by formal compliance with rule-like decision rules implementing those
constitutional commands. As we have demonstrated here, AEDs have been present
from nearly the beginning of the Court and appear in all areas of constitutional law.
In Part III, we argue that there are substantial benefits to optimizing the
enforcement of constitutional principles through the use of AEDs. Those benefits
are accompanied by trade-offs, however, which we also identify and assess.
III. BENEFITS AND TRADEOFFS OF ANTI-EVASION DOCTRINES
Backstopping decision rules with standards that curb officials' ability to evade
constitutional principles with superficial compliance has benefits as well as
174 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
"' 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
176 Id. at 124.
'7505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
17 1 Id. at 1015.
179 Id. at 1016 n.7.
so Id. at 1029.
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drawbacks for constitutional doctrine. On the plus side, anti-evasion doctrines help
optimize enforcement of constitutional principles by making them more difficult to
evade and address the "problems with rules" that can plague decision rules
expressed as simple rules. But the use of AEDs is not cost-free, as we make clear
in Part III.B. First, their use tends to make constitutional doctrine more complex,
which in turn raises decision costs for judges employing that doctrine. Multiplying
decision rules, thus increasing doctrinal complexity, also raises the danger of the
slippage between decision rules and the principles they were intended to
implement-what Professor Roosevelt has termed "calcification."' Finally,
because AEDs tend to take the form of standards, they are freighted with all of the
disadvantages of ex post lawmaking. In other words, as surely as AEDs address
some of the problems with rules, they introduce into doctrine the problems
with standards.
A. Benefits
1. AEDs Optimize Enforcement of Constitutional Principles
One obvious benefit of AEDs' frequent appearance in constitutional law is
that their deployment enables courts to refine and, in. theory, optimize their
enforcement of constitutional principles. Were government actors able to act in
ways that formally comply with legal rules, but nevertheless achieve the same
substantive result the rule was intended to prevent, not only would constitutional
principles go unvindicated, but it is likely that those principles would degrade over
time, perhaps even disappearing or lapsing through desuetude.18 2 The simple fact
that AEDs have long been put to work in a wide variety of doctrinal settings
suggests that the Court is not willing to tolerate underenforcement of some
constitutional principles. The primary way in which AEDs do this, in our view, is
by taking the form of standards bolstering those rules, concomitantly remedying
what Professor Sunstein once termed "problems with rules." 8 3
181 Roosevelt, supra note 6.
182 In the early twentieth century, obviously before the passage of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act, the Fifteenth Amendment was so frequently and blatantly violated around the
country-especially in the South-that calls went out for its repeal. See, e.g., Goldwin
Smith, Is the Constitution Outworn?, 166 N. AM. REv. 257, 257-67 (1898); see also Arthur
W. Machen, Jr., Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 HARV. L. REv. 169, 179-91 (1910)
(arguing that because the Fifteenth Amendment cannot be enforced in all the states, it
should be void).
183 Sunstein, supra note 29.
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2. AEDs Address "Problems with Rules"
(a) Rules, Standards, and Constitutional Doctrine
A version of the rules-versus-standards debate plays out in American
constitutional law.184 Professor Sullivan, for example, famously sorted members of
the Rehnquist Court according to their preferences for rules or standards.' 8 5 The
questions raised are identical to those posed in other areas of the law. When the
Court implements constitutional meaning, should it employ rules (e.g., "no
content-based regulation of speech") or standards (e.g., "evenhanded laws
burdening interstate commerce are valid unless the burden on interstate commerce
clearly exceeds local benefits")?
Commentators, including the Justices themselves,' 86 often argue that rules are
better for reasons including economy, predictability, stability, and equality. In a
famous article, Justice Scalia, a long-time champion of clear rules, argued that it is
preferable in law "to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to
in the explanation" of judicial decisions, "even at the expense of the mild
substantive distortion that any generalization introduces." Rules are said to offer
the following benefits: (1) by treating like cases alike, they promote fairness;' 8 8 (2)
they constrain official discretion;' 89 (3) they increase predictability;190 (4) they
increase efficiency by enabling officials to make quick decisions at relatively low
cost;' 9' and (5) they are transparent relative to decisionmaking via standards.
184 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Complexity ofJurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REv.
1, 23-59 (2011) (discussing the difficulties and trade-offs inherent in designing "clear"
rules for complex situations; using examples from civil procedure).
185 See Sullivan, supra note 15 (sorting the Justices' preferences in the 1991 term).
186 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 160, at 1179, 1182.
8 Id. at 1178.
188 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 62.
189 SCHAUER, supra note 160, at 192 ("[T]he use of directives at the rules end of the
continuum can be understood as a device for constraining or withdrawing discretion.");
Scalia, supra note 160, at 1180 ("Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.");
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 160, at 165 ("Rules usually are better than standards for
controlling subordinates or other partners who aren't perfectly trusted. ); Sullivan,
supra note 15, at 77 (noting that rules in constitutional adjudication "eliminate[] judicial
discretion to filter the Constitution through contestable contemporary political or
moral theories").
190 SCHAUER, supra note 160, at 193 ("[A] per se rule is likely to give far more
information about likely consequences of action than a less determinate standard."); Scalia,
supra note 160, at 1179.
'' FARNSWORTH, supra note 160, at 167 (noting that while rules are expensive to
generate, they are usually less costly to apply); SCHAUER, supra note 160, at 193; Sunstein,
supra note 29, at 972-74 (arguing that rules minimize the informational and political costs
of making decisions).
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(b) "Problems with Rules"
i. Over- and Underinclusiveness
But as Professor Sunstein has pointed out, rules have downsides.192 Rules, he
noted, are often under- and overinclusive.19 3 A rule, for example, mandating that
pilots retire at sixty, aimed at ensuring optimal physical fitness and mental acuity,
is underinclusive, because it will fail to weed out pilots under sixty who have
prematurely deteriorated mentally or physically. It is also overinclusive because it
forces out those over sixty who are in prime condition, losing in the bargain their
experience and judgment.
A striking feature of AEDs is how their appearance as standards seems tailor
made to meet many of the shortcomings of rules. As one example, AEDs fill gaps
in previously established decision rules, helping to address the underinclusive
nature of rule-like devices. Consider the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
(DCCD). An important decision rule enforcing the DCCD is that states may not
discriminate against interstate commerce. 19 4 Notice it is framed as a rule. But
discrimination could simply be cleverly concealed-a state could, for example,
simply ban the import of a competing product 95 or tax it in a way that advantages
its in-state competitors. 19 6 Thus, the no-facial-discrimination rule, standing alone,
is underinclusive. Problems of underinclusiveness are diminished, however, when
AEDs prohibiting discrimination in purpose or effect bolster this
antidiscrimination rule. Similarly, the Smith Court ruled that generally applicable
laws with incidental effects on religious observance do not violate the Free
Exercise Clause,1 97 but the Court later held that ostensibly generally applicable
laws whose purposes or effects targeted a particular religion were prohibited.1 98
Consider also the jurisprudence surrounding the Tonnage Clause, in which the
Court has held that even levies based on something other than a ship's literal
tonnage are subject to invalidation if the levies accomplish the same ends. 199
192 Sunstein, supra note 29, at 978.
19' Id. at 992.
194 As one of us has argued at length elsewhere, this decision rule slightly
overenforces the constitutional principle that states ought not be able to regulate interstate
commerce in ways that increase the risk of interstate friction, harming national unity.
During the Confederation era, targeting the goods coming from other states was a paradigm
example of such activity. Denning, supra note 6, at 484-87.
195 See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertisers Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
333 (1977).
196 See, e.g., Bacchus & Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 263 (1984).
197 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990).
198 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
' See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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ii. Changed Circumstances
An additional problem with rules occurs as a result of changed circumstances.
Because rules are formulated ex ante, there is a possibility that if the factual
predicates that informed the rule change, it will be difficult to update the rule
thereafter. 200 To take our pilot retirement example again, the mandatory retirement
-may have made sense when formulated. With advances in medical care and
changes in lifestyle, however, the average sixty-year-old may be in better shape
than someone who was forty-five or fifty when the mandatory retirement age was
set. And yet decisionmakers applying the rule would have few legitimate ways to
incorporate those changed circumstances into their judgments.
Again, AEDs help to mitigate the problem. Formulating AEDs as standards
provides judges with a hedge against a rule that has become outdated owing to
changed circumstances. Designers of rules lack omniscience and are unable to
foresee all possible circumstances that a rule needs to anticipate. Bolstering rules
with AEDs expressed as standards, however, allows rules to be supported in the
face of factual settings that were not anticipated at the time the rule was derived. It
may have been difficult, for example, to anticipate how committed Texas was to
keeping African-Americans from voting in its primaries. Though the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibited states from withholding voting rights on the basis of race,
Texas tried "privatizing" the primaries and the parties. 2 0 1 The Court responded
with an AED that prevented such gambits.202
iii. Conceals Discretion
Another difficulty with rules is that while they purport to constrain those
applying them, discretion is frontloaded. The line-drawing choices made in rule
formation, moreover, can be arbitrary and mask bias.203 Returning to our example,
those making our hypothetical rule may have chosen sixty because it was a nice
round number or because they were biased against older pilots. Or it could have
been a reasoned judgment made in light of the available evidence. Or sixty-two
might have been a better age. The point is that the concrete end-product of
rulemaking conceals the choices made in rule formation; those choices, moreover,
may reflect bias, laziness, or informational shortcomings of the designers.
But there is another sense in which the use of rules conceals the exercise of
discretion, this time at the point of application instead of at the point of rule
formation. As Professor Schauer has observed, courts and regulators can engage in
rule-avoidance techniques that enable them to sidestep the consequences of a
200 Sunstein, supra note 29, at 993; see also Dodson, supra note 184, at 52-53
(arguing that standards' concomitant uncertainty and discretion can "improve accuracy" by
"provid[ing] opportunities for courts to better implement and accommodate the underlying
policies in given circumstances").
201 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (plurality opinion).
202 Id. at 469-70.
203 Sunstein, supra note 29, at 994.
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particular rule.2 0 4 A common rule-avoidance technique in constitutional law is to
define particular categories of activity as lying outside the scope of the rule itself.
For example, the First Amendment subjects content-based regulations of speech to
strict scrutiny-except that there are certain categories of speech (obscenity,
"fighting words," true threats, incitement to illegal activity) deemed to lie outside
the protection of the First Amendment-categories defined by the content of the
speech.205 In another example, the Court has exempted discrimination against
interstate commerce in favor of public entities from the usual rule that
discrimination against interstate commerce is subject to heightened scrutiny.206
Deciding what is and is not covered by a given rule involves an. exercise of
discretion, but is not as transparent an exercise as, say, deciding whether an
individual's interest in expression was outweighed by some competing
governmental or societal interest-a classic exercise of discretionary balancing.2 07
Whether concern is focused at the rule-formation or rule-application stage,
AEDs help to foster more transparency in constitutional adjudication. Because
AEDs typically supplement rule-like decision rules with standard-like decision
rules, they temper any previous concealment of judicial discretion occasioned by
the formulation of the earlier rules. By taking the form of standards, which operate
ex post to increase the discretion of the decisionmaker, AEDs overtly bring the
exercise of judicial discretion back into the analysis, making it more difficult
to conceal.
iv. Fosters "Doctrinal Arbitrage"
Paradoxically, the clarity and relative precision of rules also enable
governmental actors to disregard them. As Professor Sunstein notes, "Because
rules have clear edges, they allow people to 'evade' them by engaging in conduct
that is technically exempted but that creates the same or analogous harms."208 Put
differently, rules create formal enforcement gaps that can encourage a form of
regulatory arbitrage-call it doctrinal arbitrage.
204 Schauer, supra note 31, at 312-15.
205 In United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), however, the Court turned
aside the government's attempts to expand the categories of speech that lack First
Amendment protection. Id. at 1585-86.
206 See United Haulers, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 342-46 (2007); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 341-43 (2008)
(applying the public-entities exception to discriminatory tax exemption for income derived
from state-issued bonds). For criticism of this exception, see Norman R. Williams &
Brannon P. Denning, The "New Protectionism" and the American Common Market, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 247, 255-61 (2009).
207 For a good example of the latter, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64
(1982) (frankly balancing the harms associated with child pornography against the "de
minimis" First Amendment interests of permitting the material to circulate).
208 Sunstein, supra note 29, at 995.
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The term "regulatory arbitrage" is borrowed from finance and describes the
situation occurring when a target of regulation "uses differences between economic
substance and regulatory position to evade unwelcome regulation."209 In essence,
the target uses form to evade the substance of a rule, where a gap in the law
permits such evasion. As we use it here, "doctrinal arbitrage" refers to the
opportunities for governmental actors to elevate form over substance by achieving
ends prohibited by rule-like decision rules indirectly.
One of the prime benefits of AEDs is that they function to fill the gaps left by
rule-like decision rules, thus reducing opportunities for doctrinal arbitrage. AEDs
blur the sharp edges of rules with the uncertainty and unpredictability of standards,
thus raising costs to governmental actors that would use a rule's clarity and
precision to undermine the constitutional principle the rule was intended to
enforce. 2 10 In fact, the possibility of some form of doctrinal arbitrage has led some
scholars to argue against rule-like clarity in deciding constitutional cases,
suggesting that the more actors know about where lines are drawn by the Court,
the more they can focus on either regulating right up to the line (which might
produce more regulation than when the line between the permitted and the
prohibited was blurred) or on evading the rule altogether. Criticizing the Pentagon
Papers case,211 for example, Professor Bickel wrote that the "conditions in which
government will not be allowed to restrain publication are now clearer and perhaps
more stringent than they have been." 2 12 But, he cautioned,
We are, or at least we feel, freer when we feel no need to extend our
freedom. The conflict and contention by which we extend freedom seem
to mark, or at least to threaten, a contraction; and in truth they do, for
they endanger an assumed freedom which appeared limitless because its
limits were untried. . . . We extend the legal reality of freedom at some
cost in its limitless appearance. And the cost is real.2 13
209 Regulatory Arbitrage, BUSINESsDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.business
dictionary.com/definition/regulatory-arbitrage.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). See
generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010)
("Regulatory arbitrage exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction
and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of the legal system's intrinsically
limited ability to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions with
sufficient precision." (citation omitted)).
210 Cf Stephenson, supra note 6, at 11, 50-52 (arguing that courts can and should
craft constitutional decision rules to raise costs to legislatures enacting constitutionally
dubious laws).
211 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
212 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
213 Id. Professor Dodson notes that uncertainty "can encourage healthy competition
between legal actors" and can encourage debate over underlying principles. Dodson, supra
note 184, at 54. "The idea here is that different systems work best when they are engaged
with each other over their proper jurisdictional boundaries, as opposed to staying
pacifically on their own side of the fence." Id. He adds, "clearly defined rules may stifle
thoughtful discussion, competition may stimulate it." Id.
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Clearly defined limits invite regulation up to the very edge of those limits.
The predictability with which rules are applied may reduce the costs of legislating
to that line. In many areas, however, AEDs provide some assurance that efforts to
establish some clarity and predictability cannot. be turned against the principles
they were intended to implement through easy evasion or form-over-substance
gamesmanship.
v. Substitute Proceduralfor Substantive Fairness
As a "rule of law" value, procedural fairness requires impartial and
evenhanded application of the law according to criteria that are easily discovered.
But Professor Sunstein describes another form of "due process," one which "urges
that people should be allowed not merely to test the application of law to fact, but
also to urge that their case is different from those that have gone before . .. In
other words, concepts of substantive fairness inform individuals' overall
assessment of whether a given procedure is fair or not. Rules by and large privilege
formal, procedural equality. In individual circumstances, however, this can work
hardship and seem terribly unfair.
Consider a set of parents with two teenage children, Anna and Britta. The
parents have announced to their children that curfew is 11:00 p.m. and that the
sanction for violating curfew is confinement to the home (school excepted) for ten
days. Friday evening, Anna arrives home at 11:30 p.m. because she had a flat tire
and had to call a wrecker to replace the tire before she could get home. Britta
arrives home at 1:30 a.m. because she was at a party she was not supposed to
attend. Applying the rule, the parents ground both children for ten days. One can
easily see how Anna might take cold comfort from the fact that the rule was
evenhandedly applied. Her grounding seems unfair relative to her sister's. It is
more just to treat Anna and Britta's violations of curfew differently, given the
facts, than it is to treat only one fact-that both were late-as dispositive. At the
very least, Anna should be given an opportunity to explain why her situation
warrants different treatment. Indeed, responding to just such concerns, the
authorities of medieval England saw fit to create courts of equity to temper the
hard edges of the common law.
Here, too, AEDs help provide a solution. AEDs can promote a kind of
substantive fairness, as opposed to offering simple procedural fairness-but not in
the usual way described in the rules-versus-standards debate. Instead of enabling
those subject to a rule to explain how their situation differs and why they should
not be subject to the rule, AEDs extend the reach of the rule to activities not quite
covered by it in a formal sense. Despite this difference, we still believe that the
impulse to prevent governmental actors from elevating official form over
constitutional substance-to engage in doctrinal arbitrage-proceeds from the
same sense of fairness and justice that would be offended from similar treatment
214 Sunstein, supra note 29, at 995-96.
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for Anna and Britta, above. Judges, too, share the sense that the Constitution
prohibits underhanded as well as ham-handed attempts to violate its provisions and
that it would be unfair and unjust to allow constitutional principles to be
undermined by subterfuge and artifice. This sense, we argue, is what motivates
judges to formulate AEDs in the first place.
B. Tradeoffs
It would be Panglossian of us, however, to present AEDs as an unqualified
good in constitutional doctrine. Their creation and maintenance come at a cost, and
we examine the tradeoffs in this section. For all their utility, AEDs undoubtedly
contribute to doctrinal complexity. This, in turn, increases decision and error costs
for the judiciary, and it may result in a diminished perception of the Court's
legitimacy. Moreover, the proliferation of decision rules raises the specter that, as
these rules are continuously refined, areas of doctrine can fall prey to what
Professor Roosevelt termed "calcification" 215-that is, the conflation of the
decision rule with the underlying principle it was designed to implement. Perhaps
most importantly, the standard-like nature of AEDs, while addressing problems
with rules, introduces the problems with standards.
1. AEDs Contribute to Doctrinal Complexity
As you might recall when you made an outline for constitutional law, the
doctrines that implement that document can be maddeningly complex. Balancing
formulas, three-part tests, and oft-forgotten exceptions abound. Doctrine-AEDs
included-can be complicated, bewildering stuff, as demonstrated by Professor
Berman's "first and partial stab" at "a comprehensive statement of judicial doctrine
effectuating"2 16 the First Amendment's command that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech"217:
A law constitutes an impermissible abridgment of the freedom of speech
if: it regulates expression on the basis of its content or viewpoint and is
not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest,
except that content-based regulation of non-misleading speech that
proposes a lawful economic transaction is permitted if the regulation
directly advances a substantial government interest that could not be
advanced equally well by a less speech-restrictive regulation, and except
too that content-based regulation of speech is freely permitted if, inter
alia, the regulated speech proposes an unlawful economic transaction or
215 Roosevelt, supra note 6.
216 Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision
Rules: Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONsT. COMMENT. 39,
39 (2010).
217 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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a lawful transaction in a misleading way, or if it is sexually explicit and
as a whole appeals to the prurient interest, and depicts or describes
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious artistic,
political, or scientific value, or if it includes the sexually explicit
depiction of children, or if the speech, by its very utterance inflicts injury
or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace; all subject to the
caveat that even when speech may permissibly be regulated, if that
regulation takes the form of a prior restraint on its issuance, then the
regulation is ordinarily presumptively impermissible; and furthermore, a
content-neutral regulation of speech is impermissible unless it is
narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government interest and leaves
open ample alternative channels of communication.2 18
Even this statement, Professor Berman acknowledged, was incomplete,2 19 but if we
tried to replicate his efforts for equally brief clauses found elsewhere in the
Constitution, we suspect that our sentences would resemble Professor Berman's.
Nearly twenty years before Professor Berman clearly distinguished the act of
interpreting constitutional provisions to fix meaning and designing decision rules
to implement that meaning, Professor Nagel sensed that was what the Court was
doing and condemned what he termed "the formulaic constitution" in no uncertain
terms. 22 0 The Court, he noted, had adopted "a new style of opinion writing" that
"emphasizes formalized doctrine expressed in elaborately layered 'tests' or
'prongs' or 'requirements' or 'standards' or 'hurdles."' 221 Professor Nagel
contrasted this complexity of the Court's opinions about the Constitution with the
simplicity and generality of the constitutional text itself.22 2 Although the text
speaks "both authoritatively and modestly," 2 23 the Court's decisions speak in the
language of the bureaucrat and the academic-complicated, multifaceted, vague,
and using words in a "puzzlingly artificial way."224
What emerge, he complained, are complex doctrinal pronouncements that
attempt to synthesize formalism and realism,2 5 with largely negative results. First,
the authority of the constitutional text is displaced. 26 Second, multiple and
inconsistent demands are propagated.227 Finally, judicial efforts are improperly
218 Berman, supra note 216, at 39-40.
219 Id. at 40 ("I have not yet said anything about those portions of the doctrine that
govem defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or invasion of privacy, or
limited public fora, or campaign finance expenditures, or the speech of public employees,
and so on.").
220 Nagel, supra note 30, at 165, 211-12.
221 Id. at 165.
222 Id. at 175-77.
223 Id. at 172.
224 Id. at 177.
22 51 d. at 181-82.
226 Id. at 182.
227 Id. at 202.
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devoted to formulating doctrine itself rather than to deciding specific, fact-
based controversies.228
To Professor Nagel, this was all nonsense. Using doctrine, courts, judges, and
scholars had interposed themselves between the Constitution and its "primary
constitutional meaning,",22 9 sometimes to the point where the doctrine they created
seemed to contradict the understanding of the text itself. Moreover, this doctrinal
subversion of the Constitution did not even have clarity or precision as virtues.
Further, Professor Nagel doubted that the formulae judges employed constrained
anyone at all. 2
3 0
Whatever the cause of Professor Nagel's formulaic Constitution,21 AEDs
definitely contribute to the proliferation of the rules and standards that make up the
warp and woof of constitutional decision rules. While complexity might benefit the
lawyers who litigate these cases and advise others of their meaning, complexity
can frustrate and bewilder the public, confuse lower courts charged with
deciphering and applying the Court's work product, and make it difficult for
lawmakers to predict what the Court will do. All of these drawbacks, in turn, can
make the Court's decisions seem more arbitrary, thus damaging the Court's
reputation as a legitimate institution. AEDs contribute to this complexity even as
they serve the purpose of making the Court's decisions more refined and
optimizing the constitutional principles they are intended to implement. But the
cost in complexity is there and must be acknowledged.
2. AEDs Increase Decision Costs
In addition, AEDs and their attendant complexity raise decision costs for
judges and justices applying them. A relatively clear, precise rule-"No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage," for example-
requires comparatively little from those applying it. First, one has to determine
what is a tonnage duty. Once established that a tonnage duty is a levy imposed on a
228 Id. at 203-05.
229 Id. at 182. Professor Nagel wrote that the formulaic style "foreclose[d]
independent judgment by the wider publics that are affected by the decisions but that have
no special claims to understanding or authority." Id. at 195. Anyone who has ever stopped
a conversation with a layperson about the Constitution by saying, "Well, the Court doesn't
read [insert constitutional provision here] that way," is familiar with this phenomenon,
often to the dismay of the interlocutor who is left wondering how the Court can elevate
itself above the document that created it.
230 Id. at 202 ("Despite their superficial precision, neither the content nor the shape of
modem formulae communicates clarity and constraint.").
23 As we make clear here, we do not agree that courts create AEDs out of either a
desire for complexity for its own sake or out of desire to confuse laypersons to ensure the
need for both lawyers and courts in dispute resolution. But see BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE
LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2011) (arguing in part that
complexity is a design feature of American law motivated in part by the desire to benefit
lawyers and judges).
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vessel calculated on its carrying capacity,2 32 it is fairly easy to decide whether a
given tax or duty fits the definition. It either does or it does not. So far, so good.
But when you graft on an AED, which says a tonnage duty is a tax levied on a
vessel's carrying capacity and "all charges, whatever their form, that impose 'a
charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port,"'2 33 a host of
other questions arise. In addition to ascertaining whether or not the levy is a
tonnage duty, the judge also has to decide whether the challenged levy is close
enough to a pure tonnage duty to warrant invalidation. To do that, the judge will
have to assess what is really being taxed, where the incidence of the tax falls, what
the motives of the legislature were, and so on. For each of these questions,
evidence may be inconclusive or simply unavailable.
Consider, too, the various purpose and effects tests the Court applies in areas
as varied as free speech, free exercise, and the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. It's all well and good to say that facially neutral laws having
discriminatory effects or that target religious observance are subject to heightened
scrutiny, but judges must then articulate which effects count as discriminatory and
how those effects might be proved. The same goes for purpose tests: How does one
prove a discriminatory purpose by an official body? How prevalent need the
purpose have been? What evidence suffices? Legislative reports? Floor
statements? Diary entries?
Examples could be multiplied,23 4 but the point remains that attempts to
prevent nonobvious constitutional violations increases the costs to judges of
rendering decisions. This, in turn, means that false positives (permissible laws
invalidated) or false negatives (impermissible laws upheld) may increase. Given
the difficulty of revising the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions (and of
gaining Supreme Court review of erroneous constitutional decisions by lower
courts), whatever aid is rendered by using AEDs to vindicate constitutional
principles might be offset by an overall increase in errors in the system. It might
simply exceed the capacity of the average judge to make and apply AEDs-at least
when they are constructed as standards that require careful attention to facts .235
232 BITTKER, supra note 76, at 12-38 to -39.
233 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 9 (2009) (emphasis added).
234 To offer one more recent example, Justice Ginsburg complained about the
uncertainty Chief Justice Roberts's coercion test would likely sow among lower courts.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2640 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("When future Spending Clause challenges arrive,
as they likely will in the wake of today's decision, how will litigants and judges assess
whether 'a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept the federal conditions in
exchange for federal funds?').
235 See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)
(proposing that judges' insulation from politics prevents the awareness of changing social
conditions necessary to design interpretive decision procedures).
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3. AEDs Create the Possibility of "Calcification"
Building on Professor Berman's distinction between constitutional operative
propositions and their implementing decision rules,3 Professor Roosevelt
identified certain pathologies of judicial decisonmaking that occur when the Court
conflates the two.2 37 This conflation could produce minor and major effects, the
latter of which he termed "calcification." 2 38 As decision rules that assist other
decision rules in the implementation of operative propositions, AEDs perform a
backstopping or gap-filling function when initial decision rules inadvertently
underenforce an operative proposition, to the ultimate detriment of that principle.
Therefore, AEDs might be susceptible to either the minor or major mischief that
Professor Roosevelt identifies.
The minor problems that can crop up are (1) loss of fit, and (2) subterfuge.
Loss of fit occurs when decision rules designed under one set of facts are
confronted .with changes in facts that render those earlier decision rules
untenable.239 For example, the women's movement that hit its stride in the 1970s
created problems for the Court, which previously had applied rational basis review
to sex-based classifications. One response to the loss of fit between the growing
sense that most such classifications were the product of bias and the Court's
deferential review would have been to replace rational basis review with strict
scrutiny to reflect societal suspicion of sex-based classifications' legitimacy.
Instead the Court maintained rational basis review, but applied it in a more
aggressive, less deferential manner. 24 0 In so doing, the Court engaged in what
Professor Roosevelt terms subterfuge,24 1 in which the Court applies the decision
rules in ways that produce the opposite outcome from the one expected by the
usual operation of the decision rules employed in the cases. 24 2 Lawrence v.
Texas2 43 and Grutter v. Bollinger244 are two recent examples of this practice.
On the minor issues of loss of fit and subterfuge, AEDs score quite well. They
are, after all, a response to loss of fit between decision rules and the operative
propositions caused by a failure to close off avenues of evasion, creativity by
would-be violators, and the like. By performing this function, AEDs could
potentially extend the useful life of decision rules-shoring them up as experience
236 Berman, supra note 216, at 41.
237 Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1658-67.
238 Id. at 1692-93.
239 Id. at 1686-87.
240 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 32-34 (1972)
(discussing Reed and its use of a more rigorous form of rational basis review).
241 Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1689.
242 Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 945 (2004).
243 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
244 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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reveals gaps. By keeping judges focused on the underlying principles and
encouraging optimal enforcement of them, AEDs potentially enable "judges to
engage the underlying policies, explore them, try them in different circumstances,
discard them when they no longer make sense, and generally enhance the systemic
and dynamic understanding" of constitutional doctrine.24 5
AEDs would not seem to serve as a convenient vehicle for subterfuge either.
The purpose of AEDs, after all, is to optimize existing decision rules, not to furnish
a means of avoiding their application. In any event, subterfuge is not caused by
decision rules per se; it is the result, rather, of the justices themselves declining to
apply those rules honestly. No set of rules or standards discharges its function if it
is unfaithfully, dishonestly, or haphazardly applied.
Professor Roosevelt is critical of subterfuge,246 but calcification was his main
worry about a Court that conflates decision rules with constitutional operative
propositions. The source of the danger is easy enough to pinpoint:
In its early encounters with a particular constitutional provision, the
Court tends to stay quite close to the constitutional operative proposition.
As time passes, doctrine becomes more complex. Judicial experience
with the sort of problems presented by adjudication under a particular
provision leads to the development of decision rules that depart from the
operative proposition. When initially articulating such decision rules, the
Court frequently explains what it is doing, and why-that, for instance, it
is deferring to congressional determinations about effects on commerce
because of legislative competence, or that it is ratcheting up the level of
scrutiny for gender-based discrimination because of pervasive prejudice
247
and stereotyping.
But, he cautions, "when a stable jurisprudential regime has persisted for a period of
time, decision rules can start to be mistaken for constitutional operative
propositions. When this happens, a number of undesirable consequences follow,"
such as "ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts to bind nonjudicial actors to
decision rules rather than operative propositions, and an undoing of the benefits of
decision rules."24 8
245 Dodson, supra note 184, at 54.
246 However useful subterfuge is in reducing cognitive dissonance among the justices,
it has a number of negative effects, according to Professor Roosevelt. The technique "is
confusing to lower court judges, who must puzzle out how to follow a Court whose words
diverge from its practice." Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1691. (And, he might have added, to
lawmakers and other officials who might be crafting legislation in light of the Court's
ruling.) It also makes the Court "appear arrogant, unprincipled, or both. It suggests a lack
of faith in either the lower courts or the unannounced rule, or perhaps a belief that society
will not accept it." Id.
247 Id. at 1692.
24 8 Id. at 1693.
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Doctrine can be warped when a "court . . . discard[s] decision rules not
because they have lost fit but because they do not make sense as operative
propositions. Alternatively, it may accept them as operative propositions and make
other doctrinal changes, in the same or related fields, in order to maintain
consistency."24 9
Conflating decision rules and operative propositions also has the effect of
judicializing the Constitution-creating what Professor Tushnet called "judicial
overhang" that might unduly influence nonjudicial debates about the
Constitution. 25 0 "When the Court treats its decision rules as operative propositions,
it announces as constitutional truths rules that should neither be followed by
nonjudicial actors nor internalized by the general public." 251
AEDs might present calcification problems unless designers remember that it
is the constitutional principle they are ultimately trying to implement, not other
decision rules. AEDs will no doubt build on existing decision rules, but they
should not focus exclusively on the latter's effective implementation.
An example from the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine can illustrate the
point. As noted earlier, the Court enforces the core of the DCCD with an
antidiscrimination rule. Facially discriminatory laws and regulations are
presumptively unconstitutional. This rule is supplemented by three AEDs: a
purpose test, an effects test, and Pike balancing. Under the latter, even
nondiscriminatory regulations for which there is no evidence of discriminatory
purpose or effect may nevertheless be invalidated if the burdens on interstate
commerce exceed the claimed local benefits.252 Pike balancing may represent the
sort of calcification that Professor Roosevelt warned against.25 3 The test is the
lineal descendant of earlier tests that measured the permissibility of state and local
regulation by whether the subject of the legislation was national or local, or
254
whether the regulation directly or indirectly regulated interstate commerce.
These decision rules, in turn, were a rough attempt to operationalize the intuition
that the Constitution imposed limits on the states' ability to regulate commerce
among the states.25 5
But if one accepts the argument that the constitutional operative proposition at
work in the DCCD is that states may not regulate interstate commerce in ways that
threaten to undermine political union-as opposed to, say, the principle that
249 id
250 MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 54-
65 (1999).
251 Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1713; see also id. at 1717 ("When the Court . .. comes
to believe that the meaning of the Constitution is exhaustively specified by a list of what
judges will uphold or strike down-it denies nonjudicial actors their appropriate role in
implementing the Constitution."); cf Nagel, supra note 30, at 182-83 (complaining about
the formulaic Constitution).
252 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
253 Denning, supra note 6, at 453-56.
254 Id. at 435-40 (describing this doctrinal evolution).
255 Id.at428-31.
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congressional control over interstate commerce is quasi-exclusive-then Pike
balancing is a poor decision rule for implementing that meaning. At most, one
might argue that Pike aids in eliminating covert discrimination, but then the
Court's energies might be better spent more clearly articulating what factors
figure into a decision that a facially neutral statute has discriminatory purposes
or effects.256
The DCCD, of course, does not exhaust the universe of potentially calcified
constitutional doctrines that employ AEDs. To take an example from the past,
when the Court was interpreting Congress's Article I, section 8 powers against a
background assumption that certain powers were reserved to the states exclusively,
its decision rules tended toward calcification. Seeking to prevent pretextual
regulations that invaded these reserved powers, the Court created decision rules
that required Congress to regulate only those things having a "direct effect" on
interstate commerce, meaning that "the activity or condition invoked . . . shall
operate proximately-not mediately, remotely, or collaterally-to produce the
effect," 257 which excluded from regulation things like mining, agriculture, and
manufacture. The Hammer Court seems to have similarly distorted decision rules
in the service of these background assumptions by concluding that Congress had
the power to prohibit interstate shipment of "inherently harmful" goods.2 58 As
critics noted both at the time and later, these decision rules seemed to collapse
meaning and doctrine unduly, narrowing the scope of congressional power in the
name of another, dubious constitutional principle protecting nontextual aspects of
state sovereignty.2 59
Fear of calcification might be what causes the Court to refrain from
expanding or fully developing nascent AEDs.260 While the Court has suggested
that, at some point, conditions on receipt of federal funds by states could become
"coercive" and thus exceed congressional power,26 1 it has not suggested where that
line resides, and it took twenty-five years for the Court finally to conclude that a
spending condition crossed it.26 2 One can envision future courts bogging down in a
256 Id. at 493-94.
257 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307 (1936).
258 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271 (1918); see supra text accompanying
notes 46-53.
. 259 See, e.g., 9 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21, at 451-52 (1984); DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 97-
98 (1990).
260 See Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-anti-evasion in
Constitutional Law (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2126733/ (discussing the significance
of the Court's failure to create and implement anti-evasion doctrines).
261 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
262 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603-07 (2012) (plurality
opinion); id. at 2658-67 (joint dissent).
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morass of decisions attempting to articulate the line between coercive and
permissible conditions263 -much as the Court did when it attempted to ascertain
what were and were not "traditional governmental functions" during the period
after National League of Cities v. Usery,2" before the Garcia case brought that
experiment to an end.265
If the chances of calcification increase as decision rules multiply, and if those
decision rules have as their object not some constitutional principle but the
implementation of prior decision rules, then the presence of AEDs in a given
doctrine could contribute to calcification. But nothing suggests that AEDs would
be more susceptible to calcification or would accelerate the conflation of operative
propositions and decision rules. In fact, in Professor Roosevelt's article, he singles
out the Court's implementation of the Equal Protection Clause's antidiscrimination
principle as a prime example of calcification.266 By requiring proof of
discriminatory intent, however, and prohibiting claims for disparate impact (a form
of effects test),267 the Equal Protection Clause is one area in which the Court seems
to have decided not to adopt a full range of AEDs. In fact, as we argue below, by
attempting to optimize enforcement of constitutional principles themselves, AEDs
may even help inoculate doctrine against calcification.268
4. AEDs Replace the "Problems with Rules" with the "Problems with Standards"
Rules' strengths are commonly held to include predictability, consistency,
transparency, and the ability to constrain judicial discretion. 26 9 For rule proponents,
standards' weaknesses are mirror images of those strengths. Standards are alleged
to be unpredictable, to result in inconsistent application, to foster opaqueness, and
263 See id. at 2640-41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(predicting future difficulty in applying coercion test).
264 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
265 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
266 Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1700-07.
267 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). The Court did concede in the next
term that sometimes intent could be inferred from context. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977). Scholars have criticized the Court
for making it difficult to prove discriminatory intent when a law or policy is facially
neutral, suggesting that the limited purpose AED furnished by Arlington Heights is of
limited use. See generally Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 1105, 1105-06, (1989) (criticizing the Court's limited focus on the process of
decisionmaking and not on the substantive fairness of the outcomes). See Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 320-21, (1987) (discussing the doctrine of discriminatory purpose
and suggesting a different way to think about racial discrimination that is more focused on
the origins and effects of racial discrimination); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 937 (1989) (arguing that the
discriminatory intent standard is inadequate).
268 See infra text accompanying notes 340-344.
269 See supra notes 184-214 and accompanying text.
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to promote discretion. Critics of standards argue that they invite rather than
constrain judicial discretion. This discretion, in turn, makes standards
unpredictable in their application, thus reducing certainty for policymakers and
legislators-as well as for lower court judges. Discretion also raises the specter of
arbitrary or uneven application in particular cases. Critics also argue that standards
sometimes require judges to make complicated empirical judgments and that
standards conceal contested value judgments from scrutiny.270 To the extent that
AEDs regularly take the form of standards, they too are vulnerable to those
critiques. As we argue in the next section, however, AEDs furnish judges with a
powerful tool to adjust doctrine to optimize enforcement of constitutional
principles. In exchange for that, we are willing to accept the problems
with standards.2 7 1
C. Assessing Anti-Evasion Doctrines
Despite these tradeoffs, we believe that AEDs are, on balance, valuable in
constitutional law. In this section, we explain why by analogizing AEDs-and
doctrinal design generally-to a form of "risk analysis."272 As we explain below,
AEDs embody what Professor Hirschman termed "the mature position."
When we think about risk regulation, the usual actors that come to mind are
administrative agencies, which issue evidence-based regulations to implement
broad goals identified by legislatures and embodied in legislation. There is
voluminous literature concerning the optimal level of risk regulation. When it
comes to regulating health and safety, some advocate a so-called precautionary
principle-the principle that "new technologies and policies should be rejected
unless and until they can be shown to be safe."273 Other risk regulators prefer cost-
benefit analysis-admittedly "a protean term"-which "encompass[es] everything
from informal consequentialism . . . to a formal, fully monetized analysis of
compensating variations based on willingness to pay and to accept." 2 74
270 For critiques of standards, as opposed to rules, see, for example, Dale A. Nance,
Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1287, 1288-90
(2006); and Scalia, supra note 160; and compare Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies,
97 CORNELL L. REv. 753 (2012), for an argument that announcing remedies ex ante can be
preferable to specifically tailoring remedies to particular wrongs for reasons similar to
those given for preferring rules to standards.
271 In addition, as we note later, AEDs offer a powerful example of the convergence
of rules and standards, which may mean that the choice between the two is not as stark as
the debate currently suggests. See infra notes 345-353 and accompanying text (discussing
Professor Schauer's "convergence thesis").
272 Our thoughts here were inspired by Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in
Constitutional Law (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 11-20, 2011) (last revised Mar.
16, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1930427/.
273 Id. at 1.
274 Id. at 27.
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But other governmental actors and institutions, besides administrative
agencies, engage in risk regulation. In a recent paper, for example, Professor
Vermeule canvassed precautionary principles in provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, in constitutional doctrine, and in modalities of constitutional
interpretation and argumentation.275 Picking up on Professor Vermeule's
comparison, we would argue that retail-level doctrinal design is a form of risk
regulation undertaken by judges attempting to implement, and optimize
enforcement of, broad constitutional principles. Just as regulators must translate
their mandate into regulations that address risks, judges must craft decision rules
that, among other things, over- or underenforce constitutional commands drawing
on a variety of factors that inform how weak or strong the decision rules will be,
whether they will take the form of rules or standards, and the like.276
As we have suggested throughout this Article, however, decision rule
formation is a continuous process, not a one-time event. 27 Thus, courts will
constantly revisit situations that call for the application of the decision rules
created to cover particular situation types. AEDs offer judges the ability to respond
to unanticipated risks to constitutional principles that emerge over time. This
means that judges need not embrace calls for maximal protections for
constitutional principles-that is, for a doctrinal equivalent of the precautionary
principle. With new technologies or policies, employing maximal protections
comes at the cost of stifling innovation and depriving the public of useful-even
life-saving-policies or technologies in the face of uncertain, perhaps even
illusory, risks. Similarly, in constitutional law, maximal judicial protections for
constitutional principles might entail a similar stifling of innovation that can make
government run more efficiently, increase public safety, enhance national security,
or provide sought-after public goods. Maximal protections may also involve
undesirable or intolerable second-guessing of electorally accountable officials.
In the clamor for constitutional protection against risk, moreover, those
seeking to apply some version of the precautionary principle often ignore
considerations such as the fact that "the status quo itself carries risks [or] that the
costs of . .. principles may outweigh the benefits."27 8 After all, anticipated risks
might not materialize; if they do, AEDs can be crafted ex post to meet the risk.
And if we are correct that AEDs generally take the form of standards as opposed to
rules, the blurring of the lines between constitutional and unconstitutional official
action can serve to deter future violations.
Because the creation and application of AEDs endeavor to achieve "optimal
precautions rather than maximal precautions,"27 9 we would argue they are
275 Id.
276 For good discussions of these factors and their role in decision rule formation, see
Berman, supra note 6, at 93-95; and Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1658-67. For a summary,
see Denning, supra note 6, at 489-91. See also Stephenson, supra note 6 (discussing how
doctrinal rules can raise costs for legislatures seeking to implement policies).277 See Baker & Kim, supra note 160 (offering a dynamic model of doctrinal formation).
278 Vermeule, supra note 272, at 1.
279 Id. at 27.
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analogous to the "mature position" suggested by Professors Hirschman and
Vermeule.2 80 According to the latter, "The mature position implies that . . . the
institutional system for interpreting and enforcing the [C]onstitution . . . should
take into account all relevant -risks, on all sides of relevant questions." 2 8 1 The
process of crafting and implementing initial decision rules and then backstopping
them with AEDs, to our minds, closely resembles such a system. Through this
process, the Court sets initial rules based on the relevant information available to it
and then revises and supplements those rules based on risk considerations that
subsequently arise. In this way, over time, the Court qua risk regulator achieves a
more balanced risk assessment, enabling it to craft exceptions and standards that
soften its prior decision rules in ways that reach more desirable outcomes.282
These outcomes, of course, take substantive form in the actual doctrine
formulated as a result of the Court's process. But we think that the process itself
achieves desirable effects apart from the rules and standards that flow from it. One
of the significant functions of the "mature position" Professor Vermeule identifies
is that "it places tradeoffs on the 'viewscreen' and thereby excludes unconstrained
demands for 'maximal safety' or 'security' against perceived risks." 2 83 We see
similar benefits in the Court's fashioning of AEDs. Despite the problems that
AEDs raise, on balance, they help to create transparency and intentionality in the
adjudicatory process. Like the "mature position," AEDs "help to serve as a
valuable intellectual corrective, by placing all relevant risks before constitutional
designers, constitutional interpreters, and the public who ultimately judges
both."2 84 The development of AEDs focuses judicial, legislative, and public
attention on the many factors that need to be considered in achieving optimal
enforcement of constitutional principles, and indeed brings to light the question of
what level and type of enforcement is optimal in the first instance. Focus on these
considerations promises to make the process of formulating constitutional doctrine
more deliberative and less impassioned, which in turn promises to improve the
substantive doctrine resulting from that process.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
Apart from their relevance in the rules-versus-standards debate, AEDs have
implications for constitutional doctrine more generally. As an initial matter, the
pervasiveness and historical pedigree of AEDs help explain, to some degree, why
constitutional doctrine is so complex. As demonstrated above, AEDs are part of the
Court's struggle to enforce constitutional principles at an optimal level. Their
primary function is to fill gaps left by oversimplified decision rules, gaps that
2 80 Id. at 26-27.
281 Id. at 30.
282 Dodson, supra note 184, at 54; see also id. at 57 (describing a mix of certain and
uncertain doctrinal rules as a "hybrid doctrine that uses a clear rule to address the easiest
cases and an uncertain rule to address the harder cases").
283 Vermeule, supra note 272, at 31 (citation omitted).
284 id
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enable governmental actors to maintain formal compliance with the rules while
simultaneously skirting the propositions those rules were designed to implement.
In short, they serve as attempts to ensure that form will not trump constitutional
substance. This interstitial function and the struggle of which it is a part almost
inevitably will result in doctrine that seems "messy" or "muddled." Moreover, the
ubiquity of AEDs indicates that such complexity is an inherent feature of
constitutional adjudication. The "formulaic Constitution" famously criticized by
Professor Nagel 285 may indeed be necessary for the system to work as it should.
The existence and function of AEDs suggest that calls for simple, predictable, and
easily applied decision rules should be met with a certain amount of skepticism.
Additionally, the presence of AEDs seems to substantiate Professor Schauer's
"convergence hypothesis," which concerns the adaptive behavior of actors who are
asked to conform to rules or standards.286 According to Professor Schauer's thesis,
actors subject to rules tend to avoid some of the strictures of those rules and
provide more discretion than the rules intend.287 Similarly, actors subject to
standards tend to impose rule-like devices on themselves, thereby limiting the
discretion that the standards were. designed to foster.2 88 The result of this
convergence is that the two categories tend to meld together such that "the
distinction between rules and standards collapses in practice." 2 89 AEDs provide
evidence for the convergence thesis in two respects. First, the efforts of
government actors to evade constitutional principles while formally adhering to
established decision rules, as well as the Court's struggle to curb such evasion
through backfilling standards, lends credence to Professor Schauer's notions about
adaptive behavior. Second, the very need to employ a mixture of both rules and
standards to achieve optimal enforcement of a constitutional principle confirms the
idea that, when doctrinal areas are viewed holistically, the distinction between
rules and standards will be much less significant than might first appear.
Finally, noticing and understanding the AED phenomenon suggests that the
formation and implementation of constitutional doctrine, as well as doctrine itself,
should be taken seriously. As one of us has noted previously, the recent focus in
constitutional scholarship on "macro-level doctrinal formation" has yielded several
benefits.2 90 Our focus here on AEDs strengthens the claim that the background
principles of doctrinal formation are a matter of high importance and worthy of
continued scholarly attention.
285 See generally Nagel, supra note 30, at 169 (arguing that the Court's adopted
formulaic style is "obtrusively elaborate rather than economical or elegant").
286 Schauer, supra note 31, at 312.
7 Id. at 312-13.
288 id.
289 Id. at 311.
290 Denning, supra note 10, at 790.
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A. The Inevitability of the Formulaic Constitution
Although we share some of Professor Nagel's criticisms, discussed above,
about the style of modem judicial opinions, we find his core implication-that
simpler and more predictable pronouncements would alleviate the complexity of
constitutional doctrine-to be unconvincing. Rather, we conclude that a certain
amount of complexity and technicality is inevitable, and AEDs serve as evidence
for this conclusion. Moreover, we also think that the use of AEDs goes a long way
toward answering his complaints about displacement of the constitutional text,
inconsistency, and misdirection of judicial focus.
First, notwithstanding any simplicity of the original document, implementing
the Constitution in an optimal way-one of the core functions of AEDs-is
inherently difficult and is bound to require more than reiterations of the text itself.
As Professor Dodson has argued in a similar context, attempts at clarity often come
at considerable cost to underlying values, and he urges that we not "overvalue the
mantra of clarity and simplicity." 291 Second, recognizing that anti-evasion is an
overarching theme in constitutional adjudication helps to explain some of the
perceived inconsistencies in constitutional doctrine. Finally, AEDs, despite being
doctrinal pronouncements themselves, nonetheless serve as attempts to avoid an
overemphasis on doctrine by responding to specific factual contexts that have
eluded earlier doctrinal formulations.
1. Constitutional Application, Formulaic Language, and Anti-Evasion
One can hardly disagree that the text of the Constitution is simpler, loftier,
and generally more accessible than the multifaceted, "highly abstract legal
jargon"292 that the Court's opinions often include. Thus, there is some validity to
Professor Nagel's criticism that the Court's ronouncements about the Constitution
are a poor substitute for the document itself. 9 Were the Constitution written in the
language of a judicial opinion, it indeed would appear "complicated," "hesitant,"
"confusing," and even "contrived." 294
To say these things, however, is not to say that the Court's constitutional
pronouncements--even with their complicated, multipart tests-are illegitimate.
The Constitution and the Court serve different purposes. The Constitution
addresses fundamentals, sets basic parameters, and lays out objectives.295 It edifies,
motivates, stirs, and inspires.296 It establishes a common narrative for the American
291 Dodson, supra note 184, at 55. He adds, "When clarity is attained ... it so deviates
from its underlying purposes as to be of questionable justification." Id.
292 Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26, 46 (2000).
293 See Nagel, supra note 30, at 175-76 (comparing text of First Amendment and
Commerce Clause to Court's pronouncements about these provisions).
294 d
295 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
296 Amar, supra note 292, at 27; Nagel, supra note 30, at 172-73.
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people despite their different backgrounds and beliefs. 297 It is a grand and majestic
document. But the Constitution is not everything, and it cannot accomplish
everything. The Constitution is not a comprehensive legal code,2 9 8 nor (as
Professor Nagel seemingly admitted) is it easily applied in every situation.299 It
must be interpreted; its meaning must be identified in the context of disputed cases.
That is part of the Court's function.
Importantly, however, constitutional interpretation is only one of the Court's
functions. In addition to identifying the meaning of the text, the Court must also
determine the method of successfully implementing that meaning.3 00 To perform
that task, "the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but
does not reflect the Constitution's meaning precisely.',3 0 As discussed earlier,
there is a difference between fixing constitutional meaning and fashioning decision
rules that put that meaning into action.302 These two judicial functions are related,
but they are not identical.
Thus, any evaluation of constitutional jurisprudence should be conducted
through the lens of both of these judicial outputs-the operative proposition of any
given textual provision and the decision rules that give that proposition effect in
individual cases. 30 3 In his critique, however, Professor Nagel seemed to conflate
the two outputs. For example, Professor Nagel praised Justice Roberts's statement
in United States v. Butler30 4 that the Court can do no more than "announce its
considered judgment upon [a constitutional] question." 30 5 For him, this approach-
simpler and more modest-better preserves the authority of the original text than
does a resort to formulae:
If in the end a court can do more than announce its judgment about the
meaning of the constitutional text . . . , that text remains separate from
the court's opinion about it. When a court claims something more
ambitious-when it seeks to demonstrate rather than to announce-there
is correspondingly less reason to distinguish the external authority from
the court's opinion. . . . [T]he judicial construction comes to be
297 Amar, supra note 292, at 47.
298 Cf McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
299 See Nagel, supra note 30, at 176 (noting "absolutism of the language" of First
Amendment and Commerce Clause but conceding that "neither provision is absolute,
because each is so general and cryptic").
300 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 11l HARv. L. REv. 54, 57 (1997).
301 id.
302 Berman, supra note 6, at 36 (noting "conceptual distinction between two sorts of
judicial work product," i.e., "constitutional meanings" and "constitutional rules").
303 Id. at 57-58; see also Berman, supra note 8, at 220-21 (proposing that
Constitutional judicial decisions fall into two categories: "constitutional operative
propositions" or "constitutional decision rules").
'0 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
305 Nagel, supra note 30, at 184 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 62-63).
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interchangeable with the original text. Interpretation can then stand in the
place of the original text.30
Clearly, there is a danger that the Court (and others) will come to treat its
doctrinal pronouncements as a substitute for the text itself. But this issue most
likely occurs as a result of "constitutional calcification"-that is, confusing the
Court's decision rules with the constitutional principles they are designed to
implement. 30 7 Indeed, Professor Nagel appears to have made this same mistake.
His focus in the above-quoted passage was on constitutional interpretation (i.e.,
determining the operative proposition of the text), yet much of the "formulaic"
language that troubled him seems to come from the Court's attempts at
implementation (i.e., creating decision rules that practically apply the operative
proposition).30 s Whatever its merits with regard to determining the operative
proposition of a constitutional text, a simple announcement generally works less
well when it comes time to enforce that proposition in actual controversies.309
This is true for a variety of reasons. To start, "general propositions do not
decide concrete cases."3 10 Structure must be provided to present and future
litigants, and a resolution to the controversy must be found. In addition, several
other considerations might influence the crafting of decision rules: (1) institutional
competence, (2) error costs, (3) fiscal concerns, (4) interbranch relations,
(5) optimizing implementation, (6) historic or democratic reasons for
underenforcement or overenforcement, (7) ideas about constitutional justice, and
(8) the level of acceptability of the rule despite reasonable disagreement about
constitutional norms.
Although these considerations may in some contexts suggest a decision rule
that closely tracks the operative proposition of a constitutional text, in many
circumstances, such an approach will prove insufficient. Consider again the
Takings Clause. The text of the Fifth Amendment provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."3 12 If the Court
interprets the word "taken" to be nothing more than the appropriation of property
by the government via eminent domain, then a decision rule implementing the
operative proposition may be relatively simple and closely aligned to the text
306 id.
307 Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1693.
308 Cf David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the
Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 833 (1993) ("Most of the time, if not always, constitutional rules
take shape at the application stage.").
309 Indeed, Professor Nagel seems to admit as much: "[T]he form appropriate for the
original document is not necessarily appropriate for its application." Nagel, supra note 30,
at 177.
310 Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1658.
311 These considerations are collected and discussed in Denning, supra note 6, at 489-
91 & n.423.
312 U.S. CoNsT. amend V.
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itself-that is, the government must have a public purpose and pay compensation
when it uses its eminent domain power. But if the word "taken" means more, if
other types of government action can "take" private property even where eminent
domain is not used, then such a rule leaves the operative proposition
underenforced. There may be valid reasons for that underenforcement, and there
may not be. Perhaps more accurately, there may be valid reasons to underenforce
the operative proposition in some cases, but not in others. In such a scenario,
finding the proper balance to achieve optimal enforcement is difficult. It requires
more than simply referring to the text or its meaning; rather, it necessitates the
crafting (and sometimes recrafting) of rules to guide judicial determinations in
specific cases. Given the number of potentially relevant considerations, a certain
amount of doctrinal intricacy is not only to be expected, but may also be necessary.
The anti-evasion pattern we identify in this Article is central to this
optimization. As such, AEDs help to reinforce the notion that crafting simple
decision rules is not easy. Returning to the Takings Clause, if the word "taken" in
the Fifth Amendment is interpreted to cover more than appropriation by eminent
domain, but the decision rule enforcing the Takings Clause only applies when
eminent domain is affirmatively used, then the government can easily avoid the
constitutional principle while simultaneously adhering to the decision rule. Rather
than condemn property under its eminent domain power, the government could
simply regulate private property in a manner that accomplishes the same
objectives. To counter such attempts at evasion, the Court would need to develop
different decision rules that apply the protections of the Takings Clause to
scenarios other than. the affirmative use of eminent domain.
But what scenarios should be covered? Should all regulation of private
property obligate the government to pay compensation? If not, which sorts of
regulatory action will trigger the takings protections and which will not?
Answering these questions-questions that are directly related to optimal
enforcement of the constitutional provision-is a complicated process that must
take into account the institutional competence of the judiciary, the democratic
nature of legislative decisions, the purposes for which private property might be
regulated, the potential for error resulting from any rule that might be established,
the acceptability and predictability of the rule for future cases, and, of course, the
need to curb future evasion. When the process of fashioning decision rules is
evaluated in this light, it is little wonder that the Court's takings doctrine is
"muddled." The task confronting the Court is not simple, and therefore, the
resulting rules-as well as the language used to convey them-are not likely to be
simple either.
In fact, Professor Nagel acknowledged the connection between anti-evasion
and formulaic language. Criticizing the Court's doctrinal statements as too closely
resembling the language of bureaucrats, Nagel nonetheless noted that bureaucratic
language has its place. "Bureaucratic language," he wrote, "can be useful ...
within official hierarchies. Within organizations, the complexity and completeness
is aimed at preventing predictable efforts at evasion .... The use of bureaucratic
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style by the Supreme Court is an effort to achieve similar purposes."3 13 The
presence of AEDs reveals that the Court is not (or at least is struggling against)
simply forsaking the meaning of the constitutional text to promote its own
doctrinal assertions. To the contrary, the very existence of AEDs provides
evidence that the Court seeks to apply the constitutional commands despite the fact
that its own prior decision rules might allow those commands to be thwarted. This
effort requires a certain amount of finesse, nuance, and elaboration. Anti-evasion,
and the struggle of which it is a part-the struggle to take the meaning of the
Constitution and apply it to multiple factual scenarios in an optimal manner-thus
helps to explain the complexity of constitutional doctrine and hints that such
complexity may be unavoidable if the system is to work as it should.
2. Anti-Evasion as Counter to Perceived Inconsistencies
Similarly, the existence of AEDs helps to explain why much constitutional
doctrine seems to take the form of "multiple, repetitive, shifting, and sometimes
inconsistent demands."314 In fact, many of the perceived inconsistencies in
constitutional doctrine may themselves be the result of AEDs. As the Court labors
to curb evasion. of constitutional meaning despite adherence to its prior decision
rules, new rules must be put in place.1  At first blush, these new rules will
naturally seem different, perhaps even incompatible, with the rules established
previously. This is not surprising given that their very existence results from the
failure of the prior rules optimally to implement the Constitution in the first place.
But by viewing the various rules together, with anti-evasion as a unifying theme,
they begin to take on a more coherent shape.
The two examples with which we began this Article-the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine (DCCD) and regulatory takings-prove illustrative. Both of these
areas are famously difficult and have often been described as incoherent.3 16 Of
course, these descriptions are in many respects accurate, and we do not attempt to
reconcile all of the potential inconsistencies here. Nor do we claim that all of the
inconsistencies are, in fact, reconcilable. Nonetheless, we argue that the anti-
evasion principle provides a rational starting point for explaining the
inconsistencies and difficulties that define the Court's jurisprudence in these areas.
313 Nagel, supra note 30, at 178 (emphasis added).
314 Id. at 202.
3 Again, although we see the typical pattern as the Court's creation of a rule-like
decision rule, followed by a subsequent standard-like AED that supplements the earlier
rule, nothing in our analysis particularly rests on whether these devices are created
separately or simultaneously.
316 See, e.g., Denning, supra note 6, at 422 (describing DCCD as "notoriously
difficult, resulting in cases with similar facts being decided differently, and the different
outcomes justified on the basis of tendentious distinctions"); Michael B. Kent, Jr.,
Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v.
Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 63 (2008) (noting descriptions of regulatory takings
doctrine as "muddled," "confused," and a "constitutional quagmire").
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The determination that a law is or is not discriminatory very nearly
determines the law's constitutionality under the DCCD, given the strict scrutiny
applied to discriminatory laws as compared to the deference given to those that do
not discriminate against out-of-state goods, services, or economic actors. And yet
courts frequently complain that "there is no clear line separating the. category of
state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the
category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach."3 17 It is a short
step from that observation to the conclusion that the DCCD "makes little sense,
and has proved virtually unworkable in application."3 1 8 Even if one recharacterizes
the antidiscrimination principle as a decision rule implementing (by perhaps
overenforcing) a constitutional command that state regulation of interstate
commerce should not imperil the political union the Constitution created, the rule
that truly nondiscriminatory but burdensome regulations should nevertheless be
invalidated is puzzling. 19 But Pike balancing makes perfect sense as an AED-a
way to ensure that cleverly concealed discrimination can be flushed out by a
reviewing court.320
Another perennial puzzle is the notorious difficulty of ascertaining how,
exactly, one should apply the DCCD's discriminatory effects and discriminatory
purpose tests. In a previous article, one of us argued that the outcomes in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertisers Commission321 and Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland,32 2 decided one year later, were simply irreconcilable and that "one or
more unarticulated reasons for the holding dictated the outcome."3 23 But if you
consider the discriminatory effects test in light of our theory of AEDs-that they
are decision-rules-as-standards backstopping decision-rules-as-rules-then the
difference in outcome becomes more tolerable. Standards by nature lack the
precision and definition of rules. This is a feature, moreover, not a bug-although
rules work well for the "easy cases," the overall idea is to keep officials uncertain
as to the location of the boundary between permissible and impermissible
regulation. AEDs thus allow both a backstop for principle-implementing rules and
a means by which courts can make relatively fine-grained distinctions between
superficially similar cases. Apparent inconsistencies at the margins are the price to
be paid for optimal-as opposed to minimal or maximal-enforcement of
317 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986).
318 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
3 Denning, supra note 6, at 493-94 (recommending that Pike balancing be
abandoned in the DCCD).
320 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671, 675-79 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (concluding that state ban on double tractor-trailers found
unconstitutional under Pike balancing, but suggesting that discriminatory purpose might
have motivated passage).
321 432 U.S. 333 (1977):
32 2 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
323 Denning, supra note 6, at 467.
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constitutional principles. And understanding that optimal enforcement, through the
mechanism of AEDs, is part of the Court's goal in formulating doctrine helps to
make that doctrine look less inconsistent than might appear at first blush.
In similar fashion, the doctrine of regulatory takings begins to take on a more
coherent shape when viewed through the prism of anti-evasion. Indeed, anti-
evasion principles seem to underlie the very notion that regulatory action might
sometimes qualify as a taking in the first place. The need to prevent government
from doing indirectly through regulation what it could not do directly through
actual seizure (at least not without paying compensation) drives the Court's takings
doctrine from start to finish.
Although the Court has struggled to articulate just when a taking will be
deemed to have occurred,32 4 anti-evasion serves as the predominate thread that
unites its tests in this area. Consider Justice Holmes's early formulation of the
doctrine: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." 3 25 To be sure, this standard provides little
guidance for determining exactly when a regulation will qualify as a taking.
Nonetheless, implicit in this language is the notion that the Court will not allow the
government to do via regulation what it could not accomplish through outright
appropriation. In fact, Justice Holmes went on to make this anti-evasion principle
even more explicit, noting that "a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change."326
Subsequent to Mahon, the Court has articulated a variety of different tests to
aid in determining when a regulation "goes too far" and becomes a taking. In Penn
Central, for example, the Court articulated the famous tripartite balancing test that
considers the economic impact of the regulation, the investment-backed
expectations of the property owner, and the character of the governmental
action.327 Two years later, the Court announced the now-defunct standard that a
regulation "effects a taking if [it] does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." 3 28 Another two
years after that, the Court held that any permanent, physical invasion of private
property was a taking per se, regardless of any other considerations. 3 29 The Court
similarly has held that regulations resulting in the total economic deprivation of a
parcel should comparably be accorded categorical treatment. 33 0 These various tests
324 This struggle partially results from the Court's failure to settle upon an operative
proposition for the Takings Clause, despite offering several alternatives.
325 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
326 Id. at 416.
327 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
328 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citations omitted), overruled
by Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
329 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
330 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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are not entirely cohesive, and they have (in the Court's own words) generated
many "vexing subsidiary questions" about takings doctrine.332 Even so, they all
relate to one central idea: checking governmental efforts to evade the constitutional
requirement to pay just compensation for the taking of private property.
The Court's recent encounter with the question of judicial takings reinforces
the anti-evasion bent of takings doctrine. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Department ofEnvironmental Protection,333 a plurality of the Court opined
that state judiciaries could "take" property by declaring "that what was once an
established right of private property no longer exists."3 34 The plurality did not
address the precise relationship between its theory of judicial takings and its
regulatory takings tests mentioned above, 3 35 but the same anti-evasion
characteristics are noticeable in both. Just as regulatory takings doctrine seeks to
prevent the government from evading the just compensation principle by
substituting regulation for condemnation, the plurality's theory of judicial takings
is aimed at efforts to evade the just compensation principle by substituting judicial
action for legislative action. 3 Despite any problems or inconsistencies that may
inhere in the Court's takings tests, this anti-evasion principle helps to join those
tests together in a somewhat more intelligible way.
At the end of the day, AEDs provide a prism through which to evaluate the
complexities and inconsistencies of the Court's doctrinal rules. Professor Nagel
noted that much of the formulaic style seems designed to constrain judges from
applying purely subjective and personal standards, although he doubted that this
was actually accomplished. Doctrine, he argued, "must be sufficiently detailed
and schematic to bind judges who otherwise might seem beyond the law."338
Whether judicial constraint is in fact a goal of doctrinal complexity-and if so,
whether that goal has sufficiently been realized-are valid questions for which we
do not provide answers. But we note that the existence of AEDs suggests that
doctrinal complexity is at least related to another type of constraint-the need to
constrain governmental actors from skirting their constitutional obligations, even
when their actions comply with established decision rules. When the Court's many
and varied doctrinal pronouncements are viewed from this vantage point, a more
coherent pattern begins to emerge.
31 See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (admitting that "our regulatory takings
jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified").
332 id.
3 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
334 Id. at 2602.
3 See generally Michael B. Kent, Jr., More Questions Than Answers: Situating
Judicial Takings Within Existing Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
143 (2011).
336 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 ("It would be absurd to
allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by
legislative fiat.").
Nagel, supra note 30, at 197-98.
338 Id. at 197.
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3. Anti-Evasion as an Attempt to Avoid Doctrinal Calcification
Finally, while we previously identified AEDs as a possible source of
calcification, it might be that they serve, conversely, to keep the Court's own
decision rules from becoming ends in themselves. AEDs are efforts by the Court to
ensure that the constitutional command does not get lost in the sea of decision
rules, but rather is enforced despite the fact that those rules may receive formal
compliance. In other words, AEDs are designed to "combine conceptualism with
fact-responsiveness." 9
Professor Nagel criticized the Court for spending an inordinate amount of
energy on developing doctrine rather than on deciding cases. The Court's attention,
he wrote, is "not directed at the actual resolution of cases at hand," but rather is
devoted to "the preliminar issue of determining the proper test to be applied in a
defined class of cases." 34 Varying factual contexts are forced into the subsets
defined by the Court's doctrine, and unexpected facts lead to the formulation of "a
wholly different formula" or to the abandonment of the constitutional inquiry
altogether. 341 For Professor Nagel, this focus on doctrine rather than adjudication
fundamentally altered the Court's role: "The modem Court's emphasis on doctrine
selection expresses and consolidates a radical shift in role from adjudicator
to regulator." 342
Any merit this criticism might have is mitigated by the pattern of AEDs
highlighted in this Article. AEDs demonstrate that the Court is not overly devoted
to doctrine for its own sake. When doctrine-in the form of established decision
rules-does not lead to appropriate enforcement of constitutional norms, the Court
will backstop that doctrine with other rules designed to ferret out and remedy
evasive action. True, this process may generate the establishment of a "wholly
different formula," in Professor Nagel's terminology, but this very act
demonstrates a willingness to alter doctrine when doing so better implements the
overriding constitutional principle.343 Similarly, the use of AEDs reflects fact
responsiveness as the Court adjusts its decision rules to address evasive behavior.
They are recognitions by the Court that, at the end of the day, it is an adjudicative
body that must resolve real controversies by optimally implementing the
Constitution. The decision rules it crafts are designed for that purpose and must be
supplemented when they fail to achieve their intended objectives. And the very
existence of AEDs suggests that the Court is generally committed to the
proposition that substance trumps form-that is, that decision rules do not exist
(and thus should not be glorified) for their own sake, but rather serve to advance
331 Id. at 203.
340 Id. at 203-04.
341 Id. at 190.
342 Id. at 204-05.
343 Id. at 190.
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deeper purposes in the law. When nonjudicial actors threaten to circumvent those
purposes, the Court will respond with new rules that fill the gaps.
B. Anti-Evasion Doctrines and the Convergence Thesis
This gap-filling process has implications for constitutional doctrine in another
respect: It provides evidence for the argument that rules and standards tend to
converge, an argument put forward most explicitly by Professor Schauer. 344 While
not discounting the genuine differences that exist between these two types of
devices, Professor Schauer has contended that, as a practical matter, the choice
between them may not matter as much as is often supposed.34 5 This is because
regardless of whether a rule or standard is chosen to enforce a particular norm,
those subject to the rule or standard-that is, those who must follow, interpret, and
apply it-tend to adapt their behavior in ways that push each device toward
the other.346
First, Professor Schauer noted that those subject to rules "will tend to convert
rules into standards by employing a battery of rule-avoiding devices that serve to
soften the hard-edges of rules."347 Such devices may take the form of exceptions,
reasonableness qualifications, contextual overrides, or interpretative devices that
rely more on the rule's purpose than on its precise phrasing.34 8 At the same time,
these same actors, "when given few rules in the rules-standards sense, will make
them themselves, and apply them to their own allegedly discretionary behaviour,
thus limiting significantly the case-sensitive discretion that it was the intention of
the rule-maker to grant." 34 9 This is accomplished through such methods as the
establishment of per se categories, incorporation of external rule-like devices into
the standard, and giving the standard precedential effect in future cases. 350 The
simultaneous adaptation of both rules and standards, Professor Schauer posited,
results in rule subjects approaching "the same point on the rules-standards
continuum regardless of whether they were given rules or standards as their
starting raw material." 35 1 Consequently, "the choice between rules and standards
makes far less difference than is generally believed to be the case."352
34 See generally Schauer, supra note 31 (hypothesizing that adaptive institutional
behavior minimizes the distinction between "rule" and "standard").
345 Id. at 305. For another take on adaptive behavior, see Dodson, supra note 184, at
55, which states, "Clear rules simply prove too much, and, despite good intentions of
adhering to them, either rulemakers give up on designing them or courts erode them
through exceptions and interpretations."
346 See Schauer, supra note 31, at 305, 312.
34 7 Id. at 312.
348 Id. at 312-15.
349 Id. at 312.
"s0 Id. at 316-19.
* Id. at 319.
352 Id. (citation omitted).
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That constitutional doctrine exhibits signs of this convergence is apparent to a
careful observer. As Professor Faigman noted almost two decades ago, "many
constitutional results described as categorical [(i.e., rule-like)] are indistinguishable
from a standards-based method." 3 3 It is our contention that the pattern of AEDs
highlighted here helps explain the convergence effect in constitutional
jurisprudence in at least two respects: (1) by providing evidence for Professor
Schauer's theory of adaptive behavior, and (2) by demonstrating that such adaptive
behavior results in a practical blurring of the differences between rules
and standards.
1. Anti-Evasion and Adaptive Behavior
As an initial matter, the tendency of government actors to evade constitutional
imperatives despite formal adherence to decision rules, as well as the Court's
response to this evasion by crafting AEDs, demonstrates the validity of Professor
Schauer's theory about adaptive behavior. When the Court establishes a given
decision rule, those who must follow the rule devise methods that allow them to do
so technically, while simultaneously thwarting the principle the rule was designed
to safeguard. The result of this evasion is to give the rule follower more discretion
in practice than the rule was designed to bestow in theory. The Court responds by
employing another decision rule, usually framed in more standard-like language, to
help curb these evasive efforts. In this regard, AEDs seem to fall within Professor
Schauer's fourth example of rule-avoiding devices-that is, they tend to rely more
on the purpose underlying the rule rather than the specifics of the rule itself.35 4
Pursuant to this pattern, both the actors that must follow the rule and the Court that
interprets and applies it adapt their behavior in ways that render the rule more like
a standard.
Examples of this adaptive behavior can be seen fairly clearly in the Court's
jurisprudence surrounding the Fifteenth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." 355 Early applications of the amendment straightforwardly observed that
it rendered inoperative any laws that restricted the right of suffrage on the basis of
race.356 In response, several states employed other voting requirements-such as
literacy tests and certain registration schemes-that had the effect of limiting the
voting rights of African-Americans. Because these requirements did not facially
disturb the right of suffrage on account of race or any other prohibited
characteristic, they technically complied with the previous rules enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, the Court invalidated them as violating the
3 Faigman, supra note 308, at 833.
354 Schauer, supra note 31, at 314-15.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
356 See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389 (1880).
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substance of that amendment.35' Hinting at the evasive nature of the requirements,
the Court stated in one case, "The Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes of discrimination." 8
2. Anti-Evasion and the Distinction Between Rules and Standards
In addition to confirming Professor Schauer's notions about adaptive
behavior, AEDs also, and more significantly, demonstrate the tendency of
constitutional rules and standards to converge. The adaptive behavior of those who
must follow the Court's rules and the Court's adaptive behavior to backfill those
rules with standards ultimately render the difference between the two devices less
significant than is usually imagined.
AEDs, in other words, serve as agents of convergence. Through their creation
and use, the decision rules governing a particular constitutional area ultimately
employ both devices, such that the overall doctrine of that area really is a
composite somewhere between a rule and a standard. As Professor Korobkin
has observed:
Not all rules are pure rules; exceptions can render them standard-like in
some circumstances. Similarly, not all standards are pure; reliance on
precedent can make standards partially rule-like. At a certain point, rules
can become so riddled with unpredictable exceptions that they are as
much standard as rule, and standards can become so determinate that
they are as much rule as standard; these composites reside in the "gray
area" at the center of the spectrum. In more extreme cases, standards can
become so determinate that they are transformed into rules, and rules so
unpredictable that they are transformed into standards. 59
It is our contention that AEDs operate to push constitutional doctrine, viewed
holistically, into this "gray area," such that the distinction between rules and
standards ends up having little practical difference.
Once again, Takings Clause jurisprudence is illustrative. The text of the Fifth
Amendment and early decision rules implementing it can be viewed in rule-like
terms: the government must provide compensation whenever it takes private
property. 360 If this restriction applies only to direct appropriation, then its rule-like
characteristics are even more pronounced. Under such an application, direct
appropriation requires the payment of compensation; injuries to property caused by
3s7 See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1939) (registration scheme);
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 380 (1915) (registration scheme); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915) (literacy test).
358 Lane, 307 U.S. at 275.
35 Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23, 30 (2000).
36 See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336-
37 (1893).
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other government action do not.36 Of course, as we have already seen, such a rule
encourages evasive behavior by government officials, who can adapt their
behavior to accomplish the same objectives as a direct appropriation through other,
indirect means. In response to this evasion, the Court has held that regulatory
action can "take" property under certain circumstances as well, thus requiring the
same compensation as would a direct appropriation. 362 Suddenly, the rule-like
nature of the Takings Clause becomes more standard-like, with the Court deciding
after the fact whether any particular government action has "taken" property. And,
by and large, the Court has purposely eschewed any "set formula" for making that
determination, relying instead on "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" driven by
the circumstances of each case.
In employing this standard-like decision rule, however, the Court has sought
to limit discretion in certain contexts, treating certain types of regulation more
categorically. Thus, the Court has declared that a regulation that requires an owner
to suffer a permanent physical occupation of her property is a taking per se. 36 So
too has the Court declared categorical treatment appropriate for a regulation that
deprives an owner of all economically productive use of her property.365 As a
result, at least for these types of regulatory action, the standard-like framework
governing takings cases once again becomes more rule-like in nature. Moreover,
the precedential value of these holdings helps to reinforce their determinate nature.
But even these categorical rules are not pure rules. To keep them from
limiting discretion too drastically, the Court has incorporated exceptions and
nuances that allow more flexibility. For example, the Court has held that minor
deductions from a monetary award to pay for government services used in
obtaining that award are not occupations of property subject to the per se rule
noted above. 6 The Court explained:
It is artificial to view deductions of a percentage of a monetary award as
physical appropriations of property. Unlike real or personal property,
money is fungible. No special constitutional importance attaches to the
fact that the Government deducted its charge directly from the award
rather than requiring Sperry to pay it separately. If the deduction in this
case were a physical occupation requiring just compensation, so would
be any fee for services, including a filing fee that must be paid in
advance. Such a rule would be an extravagant extension of Loretto.
367
361 See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871) (employing such
a rule).
362 See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
363 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).36 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
36' Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
366 United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989).367 id.
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But lest one think that this holding simply creates another rule-like distinction
between real or personal property (which can be occupied) and money (which
cannot), the Court applied the per se rule against physical occupations to monetary
interests in a subsequent decision. 3 68 This ability to apply the per se rule in some
instances but not in others limits its "ruleness" and gives it a standard-like quality.
The other categorical rule concerning total economic deprivations provides an
even clearer example. As noted earlier, although the Court initially framed this test
in rule-like terms, any precision that was intended to inhere in the test was
undercut by the same opinion in which the test was established, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission. 36 9 After laying down the test, Justice Scalia first
admitted that there remained some question as to what exactly counted as a total
economic deprivation:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically
feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not
make clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be
measured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave
90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all
economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as
one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the
tract as a whole.3 70
Additionally, Justice Scalia created a rather fluid exception to the rule for
"restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership." 3 7 1 Just what restrictions might fall within this
exception were left unstated, although Justice Scalia indicated that the answer
normally would require courts to engage in a nuisance-like inquiry.37 2 Thus, to
determine whether categorical treatment really is appropriate, courts would need to
consider factors like: (1) the degree of harm to public lands, resources, or
neighboring parcels posed by the restricted activities; (2) the social value of those
activities; (3) the suitability of the activities to the local area; and (4) the ease with
which the alleged harm can be avoided through other measures. 373 These
considerations effectively turn the categorical rule into an indeterminate standard.
There are more examples of this phenomenon, but these aspects of regulatory
takings law suffice to make the point. The Court's takings jurisprudence consists
of a web of interrelated rules and standards that push takings doctrine as a whole
into the "gray area" identified by Professor Korobkin. And inasmuch as the entire
368 Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003).
369 505 U.S. 1003.
3 70 Id. at 1016 n.7.
371 Id. at 1029.
372 See id. at 1030-31.
3 See id.
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field of regulatory takings is itself an elaborate anti-evasion doctrine, it
demonstrates that AEDs act as vehicles of convergence, pushing rules toward
standards and vice versa. Because AEDs are ubiquitous in constitutional law, this
convergence suggests that the practical distinctions between rule-like and standard-
like decision rules are not as meaningful as they may appear. Whichever device is
selected, both those subject to it and the Court will adapt in ways that, ultimately,
will result in overall doctrine being somewhere in the middle.
C. The Case for Taking Doctrine Seriously
A final implication of AEDs is that they reinforce some of the benefits of
what one of us has termed the "New Doctrinalism." 37 4 This recent trend in legal
scholarship differs from older forms of doctrinal study that offered descriptions
and analyses of the cases that formed particular constitutional subject areas.
Rather, it focuses on the Court's creation and application of devices to implement
the Constitution-that is, "how the Court takes general propositions about
constitutional meaning and constructs rules that enable it to decide particular
cases." 375 This emphasis on doctrinal formation has yielded several advantages in
constitutional scholarship,7 and we think that the pattern of AEDs highlighted
here buttresses the claim that the causes and effects of doctrine creation, as an area
of constitutional inquiry, should be taken seriously.
To begin with, it is important to understand what the Court is doing when it
decides the cases that come before it. As noted earlier, the Court not only interprets
the Constitution to fix its meaning, but it also must decide how to implement its
interpretations in actual controversies and provide guidance to lower courts and
others who must also implement the law. Recognizing that there is a distinction
between interpretation and implementation-even if that distinction is sometimes
fuzzy3 7 7 -sharpens our knowledge of the Court's jurisprudence in ways that
transcend tired debates over proper methods of interpretation. That many (if not
most) areas of constitutional law are infused with AEDs, for example, draws
attention to the Court's struggle to optimize enforcement of constitutional meaning
in the face of actors who seek to circumvent that meaning. Regardless of whether
one agrees with the Court's underlying interpretation or its methods for arriving at
that interpretation, the existence of AEDs reveals something significant: whatever
the correct interpretative approach toward or meaning of a constitutional provision,
once the meaning is settled upon and implemented, there will almost always be
attempts to elude that meaning by promoting form over substance. Further judicial
action will then be necessary to ensure that substance triumphs. This pattern (and
374 Denning, supra note 10, at 790.
3 Id.
376 See id. at 793-96 (identifying benefits of "New Doctrinalism").
37 Cf Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist's View of Constitutional
Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/hills.pdf (arguing that "the meaning of a
constitutional provision is its implementation").
18312012]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
whether there are ways to change or improve it) provides a point of common
inquiry among scholars, regardless of their predilections over how the Constitution
should be interpreted in the first instance.
Similarly, understanding how the Court implements constitutional commands
allows for better normative evaluation of the Court's jurisprudence. As one of us
has written elsewhere, "Any meaningful normative critique of the Court's work
must depend on an accurate descriptive account of what, in fact, the Court does
when it decides cases."m In this regard, AEDs serve as a reminder that doctrinal
formation is not a static, one-step process, but rather is dynamic and ongoing. The
Court does not simply craft doctrine and then sit back and watch that doctrine play
out; rather, it re-crafts, revises, and reformulates doctrine as new problems present
themselves. Recognizing this fact, in itself, allows a more accurate assessment of
the Court's work generally.
In like manner, recognizing that many of the Court's decision rules can be
explained as efforts to curb evasion -permits a more accurate assessment of those
rules specifically. For example, as we argue above, it may be that the rules are not
as inconsistent as might initially appear. Decisions that seem more results driven at
first blush may seem less so upon further inspection, as their anti-evasion
characteristics become more evident. In areas where the Court continuously
struggles to fashion workable AEDs, the appraisal may be different. It may be that
the Court finds itself in such a situation because it has misinterpreted the
constitutional imperative itself. These types of normative evaluations become
stronger when the Court's doctrine is actually recognized and treated as a valid
area of inquiry.
In related fashion, doctrine generally and AEDs specifically provide a
platform for considering and evaluating larger questions about the Court's
functions and capabilities. Because of their role in optimizing implementation,
AEDs raise questions and focus attention on the proper level and means of
enforcing the Constitution. Additionally, their existence exposes other issues
regarding institutional competence, interbranch relations, and the proper place of
the judiciary in a representative democracy.
Last, but certainly not least, understanding AEDs and their role in doctrinal
formation has practical value to lawyers and judges as well as to legal academics.
Familiarity with these devices, how they generally come to fruition, and how they
fit with other decision rules should better enable practitioners to frame arguments
and assist lower court judges in navigating the gaps that a particular decision rule
leaves open. Doctrinal scholarship of the type we offer here and that others have
offered before us could be useful in overcoming, in Judge Edwards's words, "the
growing disjunction between legal education and the legal profession."37 9 Judge
Edwards criticized what he believed to be the academy's overemphasis on
378 Denning, supra note 10, at 794.
379 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
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"abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.""s More
recently, Chief Justice Roberts has offered his view that a large amount of legal
scholarship "isn't of much help to the bar.",3 8 Whatever the merits of these
critiques, scholarship that pays serious attention to the formation and application of
constitutional doctrine helps to answer them.
V. CONCLUSION
Constitutional law is replete with anti-evasion doctrines (AEDs)-decision
rules taking the form of standards, which backstop or bolster other decision rules
that take the form of rules. AEDs optimize enforcement of constitutional principles
by raising costs to officials of evasion or violation of those principles by formal
compliance with decision rules that leave gaps facilitating substantive evasion-
what we here termed "doctrinal arbitrage." Despite tradeoffs, including AEDs'
contribution to doctrinal complexity and inherent limitations on standards as
opposed to rules, we have argued that AEDs represent a "mature position" in the
risk regulation in which courts engage by encouraging optimal, as opposed to
minimal or maximal, protection of constitutional principles. In addition, the
identification of AEDs has implications for constitutional doctrine generally. Not
only does their creation and application by courts help explain why constitutional
doctrine is complex, AEDs also furnish support for the "convergence hypothesis,"
which suggests rules and standards tend to converge over time. Finally, our Article
highlights the benefits of continued study of the doctrinal rules created and applied
by courts.
380 d.
381 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds After Chief Justice Roberts Disses
Legal Scholarship, A.B.A. J. (July 7, 2011, 5:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/law-prof responds-after-chief justicejroberts disseslegal-scholarship/.
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